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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of economies of density in transportation markets, focusing
on ridesharing. Our theoretical model predicts that (i) economies of density skew the supply of
drivers away from less dense regions, (ii) the skew will be more pronounced for smaller platforms,
and (iii) rideshare platforms do not find this skew efficient and thus use prices and wages to
mitigate (but not eliminate) it. We then develop a general empirical strategy with simple
implementation and limited data requirements to test for spatial skew of supply from demand.
Applying our method to ride-level, multi-platform data from New York City (NYC), we indeed
find evidence for a skew of supply toward busier areas, especially for smaller platforms. We
discuss the implications of our analysis for business strategy (e.g., surge pricing) and public
policy (e.g., consequences of breaking up or downsizing a rideshare platform).
JEL Codes: L13; R41; D62
Keywords: Spatial Markets; Transportation; Economies of Density; Market Thickness; Rideshar-
ing
1 Introduction
Spatial markets are complex: instead of overall volumes of supply and demand, these markets
involve spatial distributions of supply and demand. This leads to a number of crucial challenges
in studying such markets. Theoretically, it is challenging to characterize the equilibrium spatial
distribution of supply and its possible mismatch from that of demand because each supplier, when
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and K. Sudhir. We also thank conference and seminar participants at Lyft Marketplace Labs, The ACM transactions
on Economics and Computation (EC), Marketing Science, and Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE)
for helpful comments. We are thankful to Phonkrit Tavanisarut for excellent research assistance.
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choosing where to supply, considers not only demand forces, but also externalities from other sup-
pliers. These externalities can lead to complex phenomena such as agglomeration due to economies
of density. Additionally, it is challenging to determine whether the equilibrium spatial distribution
of supply is efficient because, when deciding where to supply, each supplier does not consider the
externality her decision may leave on the rest of the market. On the empirical side, it is challenging
to measure mismatch between the spatial distribution of supply and that of demand due to the
widely acknowledged problem that (unfulfilled) demand is unobservable.
This paper studies these theoretical and empirical questions in the context of ridesharing. Our
theoretical model shows that (i) economies of density skew the supply of drivers away from “less
dense” regions, (ii) the skew will be more pronounced for smaller rideshare platforms, and (iii) a
platform’s optimal pricing will mitigate but not eliminate the skew. Our empirical analysis provides
a method with simple implementation, general application, and limited data requirements to detect
spatial skew of supply from demand in spite of the fact that unfulfilled demand is unobserved. Using
our empirical method, we find evidence for the implications of our theoretical model regarding the
role of economies of density in shaping the distribution of supply. With this evidence in hand,
our paper then discusses the implications of the analysis for business strategy (e.g., optimal surge
pricing) and public policy (e.g., consequences of breaking up or downsizing rideshare platforms).
Our theoretical model in Section 3 examines drivers’ decision making on which region to operate
in among a set of I ≥ 2 regions in a spatial market with a monopolist rideshare platform. Each
region has an arrival rate of potential demand. Actual demand is a fraction of potential demand,
depending on price in region i. Deviating from the literature, our model endows each region with
a size rather than considering it a point. Each driver chooses a region i that, given other drivers’
choices, will maximize her revenue. Revenue in each region is positively related to the wage per
ride in that region and negatively related to the “total wait time” each driver has to wait in the
region to give a ride to a passenger. Total wait time consists of (i) “idle time,” the time it takes for
the driver to be assigned to a passenger requesting a ride, and (ii) “pickup time,” the time it takes
to arrive at the pickup location after being assigned to a passenger. More drivers operating in each
region i means a higher expected idle time in i. This forces the supply of drivers to geographically
distribute itself proportionally to the distribution of demand. On the other hand, more drivers in
region i means a lower expected pickup time in i, forcing drivers to agglomerate. The interplay
between these two forces has a key role in our results. We deliver two sets of results. First, we
fix the platform strategy on prices and wages and focus on studying driver behavior. Next, we
endogenize platform strategy.
Fixing the platform’s prices and wages at spatially uniform values across the market, we deliver
two main results. First, if region i has a higher arrival rate of potential demand per unit of size
than region i′, then at the equilibrium, region i will also get a higher number of rides even after
normalizing by its higher potential demand. In other words, access to supply will be spatially
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skewed toward denser regions. As we will discuss in detail, the intuition for this result is that
denser regions enjoy shorter pickup times, giving them economies of density and thereby attracting
more drivers. Our second result examines the impact of “thinning” the market either on one side
only (a decrease in the total number of drivers) or on both sides (a proportional decrease in demand
in each region and total number of drivers). We develop an inductive technique to prove that while
each such thinning preserves the demand ratios, it skews the equilibrium supply ratio between any
two regions toward the higher-demand region. The basic intuition is that the supply of drivers
responds to a “global thinning” of the market, which increases pickup times everywhere, by further
agglomerating in regions with “thicker local markets.”
Our next set of results studies the platform’s optimal strategy. We show the efficient spatial
distribution of supply from the perspective of the platform does not involve full elimination of the
skew of supply toward denser areas. This is because the platform, too, suffers from its drivers having
to undergo long pickup times. We show, however, that the platform would optimally use regional
prices and wages as levers to mitigate the skew level that would otherwise arise in equilibrium
among drivers. This lack of full alignment between the driver-equilibrium and platform-efficient
allocations arises from the fact that each driver, by deciding against operating in a less dense region,
makes that region even sparser and, hence, less desirable for other drivers. The platform, unlike the
driver herself, is impacted by this externality. In addition to these results, we show that (similar to
the case of fixed and uniform prices and wages,) under platform optimal strategy, a thinner market
will widen the gap between access to supply in higher and lower density regions.
Section 4 provides our empirical analysis. The primary objective is to test the main two im-
plications of the theory model: with or without platform intervention, we have (i) geographical
inequity in percent fulfillment of potential demand in favor of denser regions and (ii) widened in-
equity for smaller platforms. Empirically testing for such spatial skew of supply from demand is
challenging because unfulfilled demand is unobserved. If a platform k has far fewer rides in region
i compared to i′, it is not clear how much of this is due to lower demand in i and how much is
due lower access to supply (i.e., relatively higher prices and/or wait times in i). To overcome this,
we develop a method with simple implementation and limited data requirements that is applicable
to all passenger-transportation markets irrespective of whether they have a centralized matching
system (like rideshare) or a decentralized one (like taxicabs).
Our method is called “relative outflows analysis” and is based on a simple idea that, in our
view, has been overlooked in the literature on passenger transportation markets: people move their
residences less often than they take rides. Hence, for every trip there is a “trip back” by the same
person shortly after (otherwise, the trip itself is the “trip back” for one that must have happened
shortly before). Therefore, if platform k has consistently fewer outgoing rides from region i than
it does incoming rides–meaning k has a low “relative outflow” in i–then the same population that
chooses k to enter i from other regions must have, on average, been more likely to have to choose
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other options over k to exit. We interpret this as a sign that access to supply of k is lower in i than
outside of it, due to k’s high price and/or wait time in i. We argue that alternative explanations
(such as relatively superior availability of public transit, etc. in i) may be ruled out if the relative
outflow for k is not as low in other regions with similar characteristics to i or if relative outflows
for other rideshare platforms k′ are not as low in i. In summary, our method deviates from the
literature by noting that in order to learn about unfulfilled demand in a region, one can leverage
data not only on rides starting in that region, but also on rides ending there.
We apply our method to data on rideshare platforms Uber, Lyft, and Via from July 2017 to
December 2019 in the proper New York City area (NYC). We first show that the relative outflow
of a platform’s rides in a region (i.e., outgoing rides per each incoming ride) is strongly positively
associated with the regional dropoff density, the number of incoming rides per square mile. This
pattern is counterintuitive because incoming rides are in the numerator of one quantity and the
denominator of the other. We argue, however, that this pattern is quite in line with our model
prediction of supply being skewed toward denser regions. We show it is robust to controlling for
region characteristics such as borough fixed effects, zone-type (e.g., commercial, residential) fixed
effects, and other fixed effects, even if they are interacted with each other. In addition, we test
the second implication of our theory model regarding the effect of market thickness (i.e., platform
size). We show that the gap between relative outflows in more busy and less busy areas is wider for
smaller platforms. Again, we document that this pattern is significant and robust to a rich set of
controls. Based on all of these results, we conclude that economies of density are indeed playing a
role in agglomerating drivers in busier areas and that this is more pronounced for smaller platforms.
Section 5 discusses the implications of our work for platform strategy and public policy. On the
platform strategy side, a comparison between our results and the literature on pricing in rideshare
suggests that the optimal approach to surge pricing is vastly different when the demand surge is an
outcome of a short-run shock (e.g., the end of a sports event) or a long-run recurring one (e.g., rush
hours). We argue that in the latter case, unlike the former, the platform may benefit from reducing
the prices and driver wages. Our second implication for platform strategy is that it our model indeed
recommends platforms to have in place a “pickup-time bonus” rewarding drivers for choosing to
operate in outer regions and suburbs of cities. Not all platforms do this; and those that do are
doing it only in some markets and, to our knowledge, passing on the full bonus to passengers. Our
model, however, suggests that the platform should pay for part of this bonus and should consider
this payment an investment that will eventually pay off by attracting even more drivers through
decreasing pickup times in the region. On the public policy side, we argue that even though breaking
up or downsizing a rideshare platform can have positive impacts such as, respectively, increasing
competition or reducing congestion, there may be unintended consequences. In particular, such
policies will further incentivize drivers to cluster in busier areas, thereby disproportionately hurting
the outer regions. We also offer a method for estimating a minimum required platform size for a
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city so as to avoid skew of supply from outer regions. Applying our method to NYC, we estimate
the minimum required size to be between 3.29 and 3.64 million rides/month, which is around the
size Lyft reached mid 2018.
Section 6 provides a brief discussion of why our insights apply beyond rideshare markets. We
carry out the relative outflows analysis on data from the Yellow Taxicab market. We find that
the same pattern observed in the rideshare market also exists in the taxicab market but in a
much more pronounced way. A region with more dropoffs per square mile tends to have more
pickups per dropoff, controlling for boroughs, zone types, or the interaction of the two. Although
our theoretical model is focused on rideshare, we argue based on the evidence presented in this
section that capturing economies of density in the taxicab market would be of empirical and policy
relevance. To our knowledge, the current literature on the taxi market does not do this.
Section 7 concludes this paper and discusses avenues for further research.
2 Literature Review
Our paper relates to multiple strands of the literature: (i) the recent and growing literature on the
empirical analysis of geographical distribution of supply, and its possible distortion from that of
demand, in spatial markets; (ii) the literature on transportation markets (in particular ridesharing);
and (iii) the literature that studies the effects of market thickness in two-sided markets.
The empirical literature on the spatial match between supply and demand is new and small. To
our knowledge, Buchholz (2018); Brancaccio et al. (2019c) are the only papers directly examining
this issue, and papers such as Frechette et al. (2019); Brancaccio et al. (2019a,b) look at related
problems. They extend the empirical techniques in the matching literature (see Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001) for a survey) in order to structurally infer the size of unobserved demand (e.g.,
passengers searching for rides) in different locations of a decentralized-matching market when only
the size of supply (e.g., available drivers) and the number of demand-supply matches (e.g., realized
rides) are observed. They accomplish this by inverting a matching function that gives the number
of rides as a function of searches and vacancies. Our relative-outflows method is complementary.
On the one hand, it does not estimate the absolute volume of unfulfilled demand (e.g., failed
searches) in each region and, rather, focuses on inequity across regions in percent fulfillment of
potential demand. On the other hand, our method (i) is reduced form and easy to implement;
(ii) it requires data only on the number of rides rather than rides and vacant supply, search time,
etc.; (iii) it applies generally to all passenger-transportation markets regardless of whether the
matching system is centralized (e.g., rideshare) or decentralized (e.g., taxicabs);1 and, finally, (iv)
1Another subset of the literature on spatial markets that this paper builds on is the study of location decisions,
resulting in agglomeration. Papers such as Ellison and Glaeser (1997); Ahlfeldt et al. (2015); Datta and Sudhir
(2011); Holmes (2011); Miyauchi (2018) examine agglomeration of firms or residents. We add to this literature by
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our approach detects skew of supply away from a given region i even if in response to short supply,
passengers in i have learned to forego searching (which would make it look like demand is low).
The second strand of the literature to which our paper relates is the set of papers on the
functioning of transportation (in particular rideshare) markets. This strand itself can be roughly
divided into (at least) two categories. One category is the group of papers focusing on this market as
it relates to labor economics.2 The second category, to which our paper belongs, consists of papers
focusing on evaluating the performance of these markets and on market design aspects. Some of
those papers, although related to our work in many ways, focus on questions that are inherently not
spatial (examples are Cohen et al. (2016); Nikzad (2018); Lian and van Ryzin (2019); Cachon et al.
(2017); Guda and Subramanian (2019); Asadpour et al. (2019)). Others study questions that are
related to the spatial nature of the market (such as Castillo et al. (2017); Frechette et al. (2019)),
but they do not examine the spatial distribution of supply and potential mismatches with demand.
Many of the papers that do study geographical supply-demand (im)balance in transportation (such
as Banerjee et al. (2018); Afèche et al. (2018); Castro et al. (2018)) focus on the short-run, intra-day,
aspects. Some other papers (such as Buchholz (2018); Lagos (2000, 2003); Bimpikis et al. (2016);
Shapiro (2018); Lam and Liu (2017)), however, examine long-term persistent mismatches. Our
paper is complementary to this literature in that it provides a detailed theoretical and empirical
investigation of economies of density and market thickness, while abstracting away from some of
the phenomena considered in these papers.
It is worth noting that a large part of this literature has focused on the ways in which ride-share
platforms improve upon the traditional taxi system, in particular due to their flexible pricing and
superior matching algorithms (Cramer and Krueger (2016); Buchholz (2018); Frechette et al. (2019);
Cohen et al. (2016); Shapiro (2018); Castillo et al. (2017); Castro et al. (2018); Lam and Liu (2017)
among others). We add to this literature by comparing ride-share platforms to one another. We ask
why is it that some rideshare platforms outperform others on some key issues, such as geographical
reach, even though they all have superior technology relative to more traditional transportation
systems? We conclude that a matching algorithm is not sufficient and that other factors (i.e.,
adequate platform size) may be needed to ensure geographical reach. This enables our paper to
quantitatively comment on the current policy debate regarding the appropriate sizes of rideshare
platforms in NYC and other markets.
arguing, empirically and theoretically, that agglomeration is also present in transportation markets. In addition, our
comparative static theory results, which characterize how the extent of agglomeration is impacted by different factors,
may be applied beyond transportation systems.
2For instance, Chen et al. (2017) examine how much workers benefit from the schedule flexibility offered by
ridesharing. Cramer and Krueger (2016) study the extent to which ridesharing, compared to the traditional taxicab
system, reduces the portion of time drivers are working but not driving a passenger. Chen and Sheldon (2016)
examine the reaction of labor supply to the introduction of ridesharing. Buchholz et al. (2018) estimate an optimal
stopping point model to study the labor supply in the taxi-cab industry.
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The third set of papers to which we relate is a large, mostly theoretical, literature on the impact
of market thickness on the functioning of two-sided platforms in general (such as Akbarpour et al.
(2017); Ashlagi et al. (2019)) and transportation markets in particular (such as Frechette et al.
(2019); Nikzad (2018)). This literature, to our knowledge, has not examined how the spatial
distribution of supply–and its (mis)alignment with that of potential demand–responds to a change
in market thickness. Our paper focuses on this, both empirically and theoretically.
3 Theoretical Model
We develop a model of how the spatial distribution of the supply of a rideshare platform is impacted
by density and market thickness. We prove two sets of results. First, we assume prices and
wages set by the platform are fixed and uniform across regions so that we can focus on driver
behavior. We show that the equilibrium spatial distribution of supply is skewed away from that
of demand towards higher density regions. We also show the skew is more intensified for smaller
rideshare platforms. Next, we examine the platform’s objective and optimal behavior. We first
argue that the platform does indeed benefit from some skew in the geographical distribution of
supply. Nevertheless, we show that due to network externalities, the platform’s optimal distribution
of drivers across regions is less skewed towards denser areas compared to the distribution that arises
in the equilibrium among drivers. We then provide multiple results on how the platform should use
prices and wages as levers in order to mitigate (but not fully eliminate) the skew in the distribution
of supply. Additionally, we also show that the relationship between platform size and skew in the
geographical distribution of supply still holds even under platform optimal behavior. That is, the
smaller the platform, the more skewed the distribution of supply towards denser areas. The rest of
this section is organized as follows. Section 3.1 sets up the model. Section 3.2 presents our results on
driver equilibrium behavior, fixing the platform’s strategy. Section 3.3 analyzes platform’s optimal
strategy and how it relates to platform size.
3.1 Setup
We model a market with regions i ∈ {1, ..., I} and a monopolist ridesharing platform serving them.
The regions (which, depending on the application, one could think of as neighborhoods, boroughs,
etc.) are modeled as circumferences of circles, a la Salop. The circumference of circle i is denoted
t′i. The price of a ride in region i is denoted pi. The wage paid to a driver for giving a ride to a
passenger in region i is denoted ci.
In each region, passengers arrive at a rate λi(pi) per unit of time. Demand arrival rate is a
function of price pi and take the following form:
λi(pi) = λ̄if(pi)
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where λ̄i is the “potential demand” in region i and function f(·) –which is assumed uniform across
regions– captures the fraction of λ̄i that would be willing to pay pi for a ride. We assume that
f(0) = 1 and that f(·) is decreasing. In some of our results, we assume a functional form for f(·).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the density of demand in each region is decreasing




. Also, λ̄ represents the vector (λ̄1, ..., λ̄I). Each arriving passenger’s
location is uniformly distributed on the circumference of the circle. There is a total mass of
N > 0 drivers who work for the platform. In the first part of our analysis, we treat N as fixed.
Later, we endogenize N . An allocation of drivers is denoted by vector n = (n1, ..., nI) such that
Σi=1,...,Ini = N . In each region, there is a wait time for drivers before they can provide a ride to
a passenger. This total wait time is denoted Wi(ni) and is a function of ni, the number of drivers
present in the region (this notation suppresses the implicit dependence of Wi on prices). Total
wait time in each region has two components: idle time and pickup time. Idle time is the time it
takes a driver to get assigned to a ride request by a passenger. Idle time in region i is increasing
in ni. That is, the more drivers in region i, the longer it takes for each of them to get assigned
to a passenger. Pickup time is the time it takes a driver, after being assigned to a ride request,
to drive and arrive at the passenger’s pickup location. Pickup time in region i is decreasing in ni.
This is because the more drivers in region i, the more densely the region is populated with them.
Therefore each driver becomes less likely to be asked to pick up a passenger who is far away in the






















4 . In the appendix, we provide a micro-foundation for this functional form. From this
point on, we refer to ti (instead of t
′
i) as the size of region i.
The wait time curve given by eq. (1) is illustrated in Section 3.1. As can be seen there, Wi(·) is
initially decreasing in ni because the effect of pickup time is dominant. When ni is large enough,
pickup time becomes less important and Wi(·) becomes increasing in ni due to the effect of idle
time.
The core of our model is a simultaneous-move game among the drivers in which each one of
them chooses one of the I regions to operate in. Each driver seeks to maximize her expected hourly
revenue. The hourly revenue in each region i equals the wage per ride in that region multiplied by
the frequency of rides given by each driver in the region. That is, the revenue will be ciWi(ni) .
3
The total number rides given per hour in region i, denoted ri(ni), is given by the total number
of drivers in that region divided by the time each driver has to wait before giving a ride: ri(ni) ≡
3Note that this formulation abstracts away from the time it takes to drive a passenger to the dropoff location.
This assumption simplifies some of our analysis and we do not expect the results to be sensitive to it.
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Figure 1: Wait time as a function of the number of present drivers, given by eq. (1). This is illustrated in a region with
λi(pi) = 10 and ti = 2. The dashed line is
n
λ











. We denote “Access” to rides in region i by Ai(ni) and define it as the fraction of the
























are weakly less than 1. These terms show that access to rides could be
limited by high price and/or sparsity of drivers in the region. The term λ(pi)
λ̄i






captures the effect of driver sparsity. This latter term will be close to one if
the pickup time is low because the region is very small or gets many drivers.4 One could think of
this term as aggregating, in a reduced form, both potential ride requests that are not sent out due
to high wait times for passengers and ride requests that are sent out but are accepted by no driver.
We now turn to defining equilibria:
Definition 1. Under “market primitives” (λ̄, N, t), an allocation n∗ = (n∗1, ..., n
∗
I) of drivers among
the I regions is called an equilibrium if (i) Σi=1,...,In
∗
i = N , and (ii) no driver in any location i
can strictly increase her total revenue by choosing to drive in another location. Also, we call n∗ an
“all-regions” equilibrium allocation if it is an equilibrium and if n∗i > 0 for all i.
With this definition in hand, we next turn to our results.
4This term is also close to one if demand is so slow that drivers are able to fully serve it in spite of their non-trivial
pickup times.
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3.2 Analysis of Driver Behavior
In this section, we assume that all wages and prices are uniform and fixed. That is, ∃c, p such
that ∀i : ci = c and pi = p. As such, in this section, we suppress the notation on pi and denote
λi(pi) simply as λi. Additionally, when ci is uniform, then the revenue-maximization objective for
drivers boils down to wait-time minimization. In this section, the “primitives” of the market will
be (λ,N, t).
We provide three main results in this section. Our first result describes the equilibria of the
game among drivers. Our second result shows that at the equilibrium, the spatial distribution of
supply is skewed toward denser regions due to economies of density. The third result examines how
the supply distribution responds to a change in “market thickness.”
Proposition 1. The following statements are true about the equilibria of the game among drivers.
1. An equilibrium n∗ always exists. Also, for any subset J of I there is at most one equilibrium
n∗ under which n∗i > 0⇔ i ∈ J .
2. At any equilibrium n∗ such that n∗i > 0⇔ i ∈ J ⊂ I, the total wait time (hence the revenue)
is equal across regions: ∀i, j ∈ J : Wi(n∗i ) = Wj(n∗j ).
3. Suppose n∗
′
and n∗ are two equilibria such that the set of regions served by n∗ (i.e., the set
{i : n∗i > 0}) is a proper subset of the set of regions served by n∗
′
. Then driver total wait time
is strictly lower (i.e., driver revenue is higher) under n∗
′
.
The proposition is proven in the appendix.
Proposition 2. Suppose n∗ is an equilibrium allocation of drivers under market primitives (λ,N, t).
Then the following are true:
1. For all regions that get positive supply, supply ratios are skewed towards denser areas:











2. The same result holds on access to rides across regions:
∀i < j ≤ î : Ai(n∗i ) ≥ Aj(n∗j )





To illustrate, this proposition states that if region i has twice as much demand per unit of
size as region j, in the equilibrium it may get, say, three times as much supply per unit of size.
The basic intuition for why this result is true is the role of pickup times. To see this, consider
an allocation n which distributes drivers across regions proportionally to demand arrival rates,
meaning ∀i, j : niλi =
nj
λj
. It is easy to show that, under such an allocation, lower density areas have
higher total wait times. To see this, note that all regions will have the same idle time niλi . However,
for any pair of regions i, j with higher demand density at i (meaning λiti >
λj
tj
), the pickup time
at j is strictly larger. This is because tini =
ti
λi












nj . Therefore, if we start from the proportional allocation, there will be an incentive
for drivers to relocate from less dense areas to denser ones. This, of course, is only the intuition
behind the result. The formal proof has multiple extra steps and is provided in the appendix.
We now turn to studying how the equilibrium spatial distribution of the drivers responds to
a change in the platform size (i.e., market thickness). Before that, we define a change in market
thickness.
Definition 2. Consider a market with primitives (λ,N, t). We call a market with primitives
(γλ, γN, t) with γ > 1 a “two-sided thickening” of (λ,N, t). Additionally, (λ, γN, t) is a “one-
sided” thickening of (λ,N, t).
Intuitively, a two-sided thickening increases both the total number of drivers and the demand
arrival rate in each area by the same factor γ > 1. A one-sided thickening only increases the total
number of drivers. It is crucial to note that both of these changes preserve the demand ratios
between any two regions. Nevertheless, as our next result shows, making a market thinner will skew
the supply ratio between any two regions towards the denser one.
Proposition 3. Suppose n∗ is an equilibrium allocation of drivers under market primitives (λ,N, t).
Also assume (λ′, N ′, t′) is a one- or two-sided thickening of (λ,N, t). Then there exists an equilib-
rium allocation n∗
′
under (λ′, N ′, t′), which satisfies the following:
1. {i : n∗i > 0} = {i : n∗
′
i > 0}.
2. For all i, j with n∗i > 0

















3. There will be equitable access to rides as the market gets sufficiently thick:










The underlying intuition for the result is that as the market gets thicker (i.e., the platform gets
larger,) all regions get denser with drivers. As such, the importance of pickup times relative to idle
times decreases in drivers’ decision making, leading to a supply distribution that is more balanced
with demand. The proof of this proposition is also given in the appendix. The main technique used
to carry out the proof is strong induction in the number of regions. A crucial part of the proof in
the induction is to show that, when the market gets thicker, so does any “sub-market” consisting
of any arbitrary subset of all the I regions (this will be necessary for the induction step). That
is, as the global market gets thicker, the distribution of drivers does shift towards less dense areas
but not so much as to make some of the denser “sub markets” thinner relative to before the global
increase in market thickness. For details, see appendix.
To sum up, in this subsection we show that, in order to avoid longer pickup times, drivers tend to
disproportionately locate in regions with higher demand densities. We also show that this may lead
to some regions not being served at all. Additionally, we prove that this supply-demand imbalance
gets exacerbated when the platform gets downsized. All of these, however, were analyzed under
the assumption that the platform chooses uniform and fixed wages across the regions. The next
natural question is, what will happen when the platform optimally uses prices and wages as levers?
Does the platform’s optimal strategy involve “going along” with the supply-demand distribution
mismatch? Or does it involve some corrections? Next subsection is dedicated to the analysis of
these questions.
3.3 Analysis of Optimal Platform Strategy
In this subsection, we analyze the platform’s optimal strategy regarding prices and/or wages. For-
mally, we assume prices and/or wages are set to maximize the platform profit per hour which is
given by:
π(p, w) = Σi=1,...,I(pi − ci)× ri
where ri is the number of rides per hour given in region i and is a function of wages and prices
among other things.
Before studying the platform’s optimal strategy, we give a result about the difference between
the equilibrium distribution of drivers and the platform-optimal distribution of drivers under uni-
form wages and prices.
Proposition 4. Suppose that allocation n∗ is the equilibrium under market primitives (λ,N, t).
Then, for any two regions i, j with λiti >
λj
tj
, if the platform were to optimally reallocate the n∗i +n
∗
j
drivers between the two regions, it would choose n∗∗i and n
∗∗





















That is, the platform would desire some inequity in access across regions but not as much as
the equilibrium allocation among drivers naturally gives rise to. The intuition for this result is that
the platform dislikes its drivers having to do long pickups. Therefore, it also prefers some level
of geographical “imbalance” between supply and demand. However, the platform internalizes the
externalities that drivers leave on each other when deciding where to locate. These externalities
come mainly from the fact that when, at the equilibrium, a driver chooses a dense region i over
the less dense j, she makes j even sparser which increases the pickup in j. Of course her joining i
does slightly decrease the pickup time in i but the effect on i is not as large compared to j, given
the diminishing sensitivity of pickup times to the number of drivers present in a region. All of this
impacts other drivers and, hence, the platform.
Proposition 4 shows the platform would modify the distribution of drivers if it could do so at
no cost. The next natural question is whether the platform would optimally take potentially costly
actions of changing local prices and wages in order to smooth out the distribution of supply across
the regions of a market. The rest of this subsection is devoted to this analysis. The key required
change in the model is to assume that regional prices pi and wages ci are not uniform and exogenous
anymore, but are, rather, determined by the platform optimally. In addition, endogenizing the
wages will require us to endogenize the total number of drivers N . We assume the “equilibrium”
number of drivers will be such that each driver’s earning per hour is equal to an exogenously given
reservation value c̄. A flexibile N means the new market primitives will now be (λ̄, t) instead of
(λ̄, N, t). As such, making the market “thicker” when N is flexible can only take place in one form:
scaling up the demand and going from primitives (λ̄, t) to (γλ̄, t) where γ > 1. In other words, the
one-sided versus two-sided distinction between ways of making the market thicker no longer exists.
The game in this section of the paper has, therefore, two stages. First, the platform optimally
decides all regional prices and/or wages. In the second stage, potential drivers from an infinitely
large pool simultaneously decide whether to enter the market and, if so, which region to operate in.
As such, an equilibrium of the game will involve a platform strategy as well as a driver distribution.
We now turn to the formal analysis of platform optimal strategy. We provide three main results.
We first endogenize wages, while keeping prices fixed and uniform. Next, we endogenize prices while
keeping wages fixed and uniform. Finally, we endogenize both wages and prices. In each of these
three results, we speak both to the characterization of the equilibrium spatial distribution of supply,
and to how this distribution changes in response to a changed market thickness.
Proposition 5. Suppose that prices are fixed at pi = p for all i and that market primitives are
(λ̄, t). Also suppose the pair of vectors (c∗, n∗) is an equilibrium. Then, the following are true:
1. n∗ is unique. Also c∗i for any i with n
∗
i > 0 is unique.
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2. Regions that are not supplied are those with lowest demand densities:
∃µ : s.t.∀i : λ̄i
ti
< µ⇔ n∗i = 0





⇒ Ai(n∗i ) ≥ Aj(n∗j )
where the latter comparison holds with equality only if the first one does.





⇒ c∗i ≤ c∗j
where the latter comparison holds with equality only if the first one does.





) is an equilibrium under the new primitives (γλ̄, t). Then, the following are true:
1. For any i: n∗i > 0⇒ n∗
′
i > 0.


















and the latter two inequalities hold strictly only if the first one does.
3. There will be equitable access to rides as the market gets sufficiently thick:









This proposition has three main messages. First, if wages are flexible, the platform’s optimal
strategy will involve wage incentives for drivers to operate in areas with lower densities of potential
demand. This is, again, in line with the intuition that even though platforms, like drivers, find long
pickup times undesirable, they would still like to intervene and make the distribution of drivers
across regions less skewed toward busier areas. In other words, the platform will optimally try
to “build economies of density” in sparser regions. The second message is that in spite of the
platform’s intervention, the equilibrium will still exhibit lower access to supply in less dense areas
compared to denser ones. The third message is that, similar to the case of exogenous and uniform
wages, here too an increase in market thickness will lead to a more balanced supply.
In the first glance, the result in Proposition 5 may seem at odds with previously established
results in the literature that the optimal response to high demand in a region is a wage increase
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in that region in order to encourage drivers to relocate to the said region and meet the demand
(Castro et al., 2018). Note, however, that the result in Castro et al. (2018) has to do with a short
term local demand shock which could only be met if drivers in other regions are incentivized to
incur the costs of relocation. Our model, however, is complementary in that it captures steady-state
distribution of supply in the market and how it is impacted by economies of density, abstracting
away from short run shocks. As such, driver location choice in our model should be thought of as a
driver’s general strategy for where to drive on a regular basis rather than a (costly) relocation from
a region to another. Therefore, our result and the result in Castro et al. (2018) are not inconsistent
with each other. They are, rather, complements to each other, each shedding light on a different
aspect of spatial pricing in the market.
Our next proposition keeps wages fixed and allows the platform to optimally decide the regional
prices. For this proposition, we make a functional form assumption on function f(·) in equation
λi(pi) = λ̄f(pi). For this proposition and the next one, we assume f(pi) ≡ 1− αpi with α > 0.
Proposition 6. Suppose that wages are fixed at ci = c for all i and that market primitives are
(λ̄, t). Also suppose the pair of vectors (p∗, n∗) is an equilibrium. Then, the following are true:
1. n∗ is unique. Also p∗i for any i with n
∗
i > 0 is unique.
2. Regions that are not supplied are those with lowest demand densities:
∃µ : s.t.∀i : λ̄i
ti
< µ⇔ n∗i = 0





⇒ p∗i ≥ p∗j
where the latter comparison holds with equality only if the first one does.





) is an equilibrium under the new primitives (γλ̄, t). Then, the following are true:
1. For any i: n∗i > 0⇒ n∗
′
i > 0.
2. There will be equitable access to rides as the market gets sufficiently thick:









Broadly, Proposition 6 has similar messages to those of Proposition 5. There are, however, two
additional points worth noting about Proposition 6. First, unlike Proposition 5, Proposition 6 does
not claim that as the market gets thicker, access to rides becomes more balanced across regions.
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One could construct a counter-example for such a claim in the case of fixed wages and endegenous
prices. One can show that the comparative static result does hold if the platform is large enough
(i.e., if γ is large enough).5
The second, and more crucial, point about Proposition 6 is how it should be understood as it
relates to surge pricing. Proposition 6 suggests that prices should be higher regions with higher
densities of potential demand. This outcome may seem in-line with what one would naturally expect
in this spatial market and with results already established in the literature (Castro et al., 2018).
Nevertheless, our result holds only because of the network externalities that arise from pickup times.
That is, regions with higher demand density can attract more drivers which leads to lower pickup
times which, in turn, further helps sustain the number of present drivers. Given the diminishing
sensitivity of pickup times to the number of drivers in the region, the effect of a price increase in
dense regions will be restricted to a decrease in demand. However, in regions with lower demand
densities and, hence, longer pickup times, the demand decrease arising from a price increase will
have a more substantial adverse consequences through network effects: with every driver leaving
the region as a result of the lower demand, the pickup time for the remaining drivers increases,
further encouraging drivers to leave. As a consequence, a permanent price increase is a safer action
for the platform in denser regions compared to less dense ones. This mechanism is different from
Castro et al. (2018) who focus on short-run demand shocks. In fact, in our model, if we abstract
away from pickup time frictions (by setting vector t to zero), the optimal price will be uniform
across regions even though some regions have higher demand densities than others.
Next, we study the platform’s optimal strategy when both wages and prices are flexible. Propo-
sitions 5 and 6 suggest that there are multiple economic forces governing the platform’s optimal
behavior, and that these forces may pull the optimal strategy in different directions. To see this,
consider the following scenarios. First suppose the platform, in line with Proposition 5, offers higher
wages in less dense regions. In this case, when we make the prices also flexible, the platform would
have some incentive to also increase the prices in denser areas because the platform has a higher
marginal cost (due to driver wages) in those areas. As a second scenario, suppose the platform,
in line with Proposition 6, has decided to offer lower prices in less dense areas. In this case, when
5We skip the provision of a counter-example as well as the proof for large γ (both would be available upon request).
Instead, we provide some intuition for why the result does not always hold for small γ values. To see the intuition,
consider a region i that is just dense enough to attract non-zero supply under the platform’s optimal pricing strategy
and with a fixed wage c. Now consider the effect of an increase in the region’s potential demand arrival rate from
λ̄i to γλ̄i with γ > 1. In response to this demand increase, the platform can decide either (i) to do very little price
increase and enjoy the extra volume of demand which also helps with attracting more drivers, or (ii) to increase the
price substantially and focus on the margin instead of the volume. If, under the original λ̄i, the price elasticity is low
at p∗i , then the platform will choose the latter strategy in response to a scale-up to γλ̄i. This could lead to a decrease
in access to rides. If the fixed wage c is small enough, indeed the market can get formed at a p∗i low enough so that
it induces a low price elasticity. We have confirmed this intuition using numerical simulations of the market.
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wages also become flexible, there is some incentive for the platform to offer lower wages in less dense
areas, passing at least part of the regional price cut on to drivers. Third, and last, the platform
could adhere to the results from both Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 and offer both lower prices
and higher wages in less dense regions. It is not obvious which one of these scenarios (or what
combination of them) would prevail when prices and wages are both flexible. Put differently, the
platform’s incentive to build economies of density pulls the prices down and wages up in sparser
areas. But lower prices themselves push wages down; and, likewise, higher wages themselves push
prices up. The overall outcome of the interaction among these multiple forces is not clear. Our
next result speaks to this question:
Proposition 7. Suppose prices and wages are both flexible and that market primitives are (λ̄, t).
Also suppose the triple (c∗, p∗, n∗) is an equilibrium. Then, the following are true:
1. n∗ is unique. Also c∗i and p
∗
i for any i with n
∗
i > 0 are unique.
2. Regions that are not supplied are those with lowest demand densities:
∃µ : s.t.∀i : λ̄i
ti
< µ⇔ n∗i = 0





⇒ Ai(n∗i ) ≥ Aj(n∗j )
where the latter comparison holds with equality only if the first one does.









p∗i − p∗j ≤ c∗i − c∗j
where the latter three comparisons hold with equality only if the first one does.







) is an equilibrium under the new primitives (γλ̄, t). Then, the following are true:
1. For any i: n∗i > 0⇒ n∗
′
i > 0.



















3. There will be equitable access to rides as the market gets sufficiently thick:









Proposition 7 has similar messages to the previous two results. It shows that (i) the platform
uses prices and wages to make the distribution of supply more even, that (ii) the platform’s optimal
strategy involves only mitigating (rather than eliminating) the uneven distribution of supply at the
equilibrium, and that (iii) the unevenness will be more pronounced for smaller platforms.
In addition to the above messages, Proposition 7 also resolves the ambiguity regarding the overall
effect of the aforementioned opposing economic forces on regional prices and wages. Proposition 7
says that it is the higher wages implied by Proposition 5 for lower density areas that pushes the
prices up in those regions (rather than the lower prices implied by Proposition 6 pushing the regional
wages down). One possible intuition for this result is the more direct effect of wages (compared
to prices) on establishing a network of drivers in a region. A lower price pi in region i reduces the
idle time in the region but does not directly change the pickup time (it will impact the pickup time
only in equilibrium once more drivers are attracted to the region). A higher wage ci, however, acts
as if both the pickup time and the idle time have been reduced.
Proposition 7 concludes the theory portion of this paper.6 The remainder of this paper is
devoted to empirically testing some of the implications of the model (Section 4), a discussion of
the implications for policy and business strategy (Section 5), and arguing for the relevance of our
insights to the taxicab market (Section 6).
4 Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this section is to empirically test the relevance and validity of the model through
testing some of its main implications. More specifically, we would like to test (i) whether access to
supply decreases as density of potential demand decreases and (ii) whether the gap between access
to supply in higher and lower density areas is wider for smaller platforms. These are two implica-
tions of the theoretical model which were robust to whether the rideshare platform is deliberately
intervening to change the spatial distribution of supply. We see these tests as tests of whether our
model and insights and recommendations are empirically relevant.
Direct empirical tests of spatial inequity in access to rides are impossible. This is because in
any region i, access to rides Ai is defined as
ri
λ̄i
, the fraction of potential demand λ̄i that end
up with rides. The number of rides ri is observable in some datasets but potential demand λ̄i is
6There are several other interesting results that can be proven, which we skip in this paper. For instance, one
can show that many of our results will remain robust –subject to some modifications– if we allow price elasticity of
demand and drivers’ willingness to work to be region-dependent (i.e., if we had αi and c̄i instead of α and c̄). Those
results would be available upon request.
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unobservable even by rideshare platforms themselves. The closest thing to λ̄i on which data is
available (usually only to rideshare platforms) is the number of people who opened the rideshare
app regardless of whether they ended up with a ride. Note, however, that this does not provide a
reliable measure of λ̄i given that, in the long run, those who need rides in region i may respond to
persistently high prices and/or wait times in the region by not going on the app in the first place.
In other words, in the long run, only the portion of λ̄i that expects to find a ride may go on the app.
Therefore, ri divided by the total frequency of app sessions in region i may be fairly homogeneous
even if there is substantial heterogeneity in ri
λ̄i
across regions i. This unobservability of λ̄i makes a
direct test of heterogeneity in ri
λ̄i
challenging to carry out.
Our solution to this challenge is to devise an indirect test. To this end, we leverage a feature
of passenger transportation markets which (i) we believe is a powerful tool in empirically identi-
fying spatial supply-demand mismatches, and which (ii) has been overlooked in the literature. In
passenger transportation markets, it is reasonable to assume that for every trip, there is a “trip
back” by the same person. Roughly, this suggests that if passengers consistently use platform k
less often to exit region i than they do to enter it, then it means the same population that chooses
platform k over other options to enter i is systematically more likely to end up having to choose
other options over platform k to exit.7 Under assumptions that we will be more specific about later
in this section, and after controlling for some possible confounds, we conclude from such a data
pattern that access to (inter-region) rides with platform k is lower in region i than outside of it.8
Based on the strategy above, we devise regression analyses to test both whether there is ge-
ographical heterogeneity in access to rideshare across regions and whether this heterogeneity is
exacerbated when the platform is smaller (i.e., the market is thinner). Before getting to the re-
gressions, however, we discuss our data and provide several visualizations that convey the main
intuition behind our subsequent empirical analysis.
4.1 Data and Summary Statistics
We have multiple sources of data. For our main analysis, we use ride-level data on all rides with
three platforms Uber, Lyft, and Via within the New York City proper area from July 2017 to
December 2019. Uber, is the largest platform whose total number of rides given in NYC per month
7Crucially, this gap between the inflow and the outflow is not impacted by whether passengers try and fail to find
outgoing rides or they have learned to not even go on the app to search.
8Note that our theoretical model does not capture flows of rides across regions. Consequently, it does not capture
relative outflows directly. Nevertheless, we do not see this as a weakness of the model. Our theory is focused on
how to explain the impacts of economies of density and market thickness on spatial distribution of supply, whereas
our empirical analysis will be focused on how to identify those impacts. Relative outflows have a key role in the
identification; therefore they are at the heart of our empirical analysis. They do not, however, have a crucial role
in the underlying mechanism. Therefore, our theoretical model abstracts away from them. Put in simpler terms,
relative outflow patterns are informative consequences of economies of density rather than key antecedents of it.
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grew from 8.7M in the beginning of our dataset to 15.6M. Lyft is the second largest platform
with the highest growth rate. Its size, over the same time period, grew from 2.2M rides/month to
5.2M rides/month in NYC. Via is the smallest platform with a size that oscillated around 0.9M
rides/month over the course of our data.
For each ride from these three platforms, we observe the exact date, time, and location both
for the pickup and the dropoff. We augment. The “location” in our data is one of 263 “taxi zones”
that partition NYC. Each such zone belongs to one of the five “boroughs” of NYC: Manhattan,
Brooklyn, The Bronx, Queens, and Staten Island. These boroughs and their population densities
are shown in Fig. 2 . In addition, we leverage a zoning districts data (provided by NYC Planning
Labs) which contains information on the “zoning type” for each taxi zone. The possible types are:
residential, commercial, park, and manufacturing. We use these data to provide empirical tests of
our theory.
We use two other sources of data for our analysis in the discussion section (i.e., Section 6). The
first data source consists of “surge multipliers” and estimated arrival times (ETA) for rideshare
platforms Uber and Lyft recorded in 195 locations in NYC every 30 minutes from May to June
of 2016. We use this dataset to discuss whether platforms’ spatial pricing strategies are guided
by concerns about economics of density. The second data source that we use is ride-level data
with pickup and dropoff locations (similar to the dataset in our main analysis) for Yellow Cab
taxis. We use these data to argue that even though our model focuses on rideshare, our empirical
approach can be applied to the taxi market; and, once applied to that market, it yields evidence
for a pronounced role of economies of density.
There are a number of reasons why we chose NYC as the setting for our empirical analysis.
First, it is the only city from which data on both pickup and dropoff locations is available from
multiple rideshare platforms. Both of these features play key roles in our analysis. Second, NYC
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is one of the densest cities in the world. Therefore, if frictions from low density impact the spatial
distribution of supply in NYC, it is reasonable to conclude they must be relevant in other markets
too. Third, the NYC government provides a number of additional datasets which are useful for our
analysis (such as data on taxicabs and data on districting of the city into residential, commercial,
manufacturing, and park zones).
Before getting to the main empirical analysis, we visualize some data patterns that speak to
the tests we will be carrying out in the subsequent sections.
Fig. 3 represent the “relative outflows” across different taxi zones in NYC for Uber, Lyft, and
Via. Panel (a) corresponds to July 2017 and Panel (b) depicts one year later, July 2018. The
relative outflow for any platform k in region i during some period d is defined by the number of
rides with k that exit i during period d divided by the number of rides with k entering i during
the same period. Two patterns are noteworthy in these figures. First, the relative outflow tends
to be higher in busier areas of the city, and it decreases as we move towards the outer, less busy
regions. Second, the gap between the relative outflows of busier and less busy areas is wider for
smaller platforms than it is for larger ones (Fig. 3 visualizes this by showing that the heat maps
of relative outflows for smaller platforms are more “colorful”). For instance, the relative outflow
for Lyft in Staten Island is was close to 60% during July 2017, suggesting that out of every 100
passengers who chose Lyft over other options to enter that regions, close to 40 had to use other
options to leave. The same gap between Staten Island and Manhattan, however, is not observed for
Uber during the same period. Neither is it observed for Lyft in July 2018 when Lyft was a larger
platform. A much wider such gap is observed for Via which was much smaller in size than both
Uber and Lyft. See appendix for Fig. 12 which is similar to Fig. 3 but shows the relative outflows
at the borough level instead of the taxi zone level. There we also discuss some of the less intuitive
patterns (such as higher relative outflows for some zones in Staten Island and Queens).
In subsequent sections we will formally argue that that the observed relative-outflow gap among
regions has to do with economies of density. We do so by controlling for a variety of possible
confounds. Before getting to that, more formal, analysis, however, we show additional data patterns
in this section that are informative about the nature of the observed gap between the relative
outflows in different areas.
Fig. 4 depicts the hourly patterns of relative outflows during July 2017 for Lyft from three
different zones. Panel (b) is Alphabet City, a residential area in lower Manhattan. Similar to other
residential areas (such as Riverdale in the Bronx, depicted in panel (c)), the relative outflow in
Alphabet City peaks in the morning and then gradually decreases. This is the opposite of the
pattern observed for a commercial area like Greenwhich Village North, also in Manhattan. In spite
of having a similar hourly pattern to Riverdale, however, Alphabet City has a high relative outflow,
much more similar to Greenwhich Village North than to Riverdale. Fig. 4, hence, is suggestive that
the overall high relative outflow in Manhattan is not merely an outcome of the concentration
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Figure 3: Relative outflows for Lyft, Uber, and Via. Panel (a) is July 2017 and Panel (b) is July 2018. The figure depicts
two important patterns: (i) relative outflow is highest in Manhattan and decreases as we move towards the outer areas; (ii) the
gap between relative outflows of Manhattan and outer boroughs is wider for smaller platforms. Both patterns are in line with
our theory model. See appendix for the same figure at the borough level. Note: Via was not operating in Bronx and Staten
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Figure 4: Hourly flows in absolute and relative terms during July 2017 for Lyft from three zones zones. The hourly relative-
outflows pattern in Alphabet City Manhattan (residential) is similar to that of Riverdale in Bronx (residential) and different
from Greenwhich Village in Manhattan (commercial). Nevertheless, the overall relative outflow in Alphabet City is high, unlike
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of commercial areas in Manhattan. If anything, we will show later, that the relative outflow in
Manhattan is high in spite of (rather than because of) its commercial areas.
Fig. 5 offers a different illustration by, this time, fixing the location and varying the platform.
This figure focuses on Staten Island and exhibits relative outflows for Uber and Lyft during July of
2017 (the first month of our data) and those for Uber, Lyft, and Via one year later. As can be seen
from this figure, smaller platforms have relative outflows (in Staten Island) that are consistently
lower than those of larger platforms. This happens even though the non-rideshare outside options
are the same for the passenger of all three platforms. This figure suggests that the persistent
differences across relative outflows of rideshare platforms are because of systematic differences in
“access” rather things such as the schedules of passengers, or outside options.
Next, we turn to carrying out the empirical tests.
4.2 Testing for Economies of Density
If all of our quantities of interest were observed, we would ideally directly test our theoretical result:
access to rides Ai =
ri
λ̄i




The positive association between these two quantities across regions i is counter-intuitive given
that λ̄i is in the numerator in Di and in the denominator in Ai. Only in light of economies of
density does the positive association between Di and Ai seem reasonable. This makes such positive
association an informative test for economies of density in the market. The challenge, as mentioned
before, is that potential demand λ̄i is essentially unobservable.
Our solution, as explained before, is to turn to relative outflows and devise a test that approx-
imates, as closely as possible, a test of a positive association between Ai and Di. More precisely,
we define the relative outflow in region i as:
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Figure 5: Cross-platform hourly comparisons of relative outflows in Staten Island. During July 2017 –panel (a)– Lyft’s
relative outflow is consistently smaller than Uber’s. During July 2018 (when Lyft had grown substantially in size) the two
platforms’ relative outflows are very close to each other throughout the day –panel (b). Via (which started operating in Staten
Island in 2018,) on the other hand, has a consistently smaller relative outflow compared to Uber and Lyft. This figure suggests

















































where r→i is the rate of outgoing rides from region i and r
←
i the rate of incoming ones. Similarly,
we define the density of dropoffs in region i by D←i ≡
r←i
ti
where ti is the size of region i in sqaure
miles.
We then test the hypothesis that ROi and D
←
i are positively associated across regions i. Sim-
ilar to the case of Ai and Di, a positive association between ROi and D
←
i is counter-intuitive
given that r←i is the numerator of one and the denominator of the other. That is, absent an
economies-of-density explanation, it is not clear why regions with more dropoffs per square mile
should systematically have more pickups per dropoff. With economies of density, however, there
would be an explanation: a region with lower dropoff rate of rides (with a given platform k) per
square mile is a “sparser” region, making it less attractive to k’s drivers due to higher pickup
times. If drivers tend to avoid this region, then passengers who come into the region using platform
k would have to use other transportation options to exit (recall we are assuming they do exit shortly
before or after entering). This leads to a low relative outflow for platform k in the region.
The regression specification that we use for testing our hypothesis is as follows:
log(ROikd) = α log(D
←
ikd) + βXikd + εikd (5)
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Here, RO and D← have been indexed not only by region i but also by platform k and time
duration d. In this setting, i denotes a “taxi zone” as described previously. Also d in this regression
is a year-month combination. The coefficient of interest is α, which according to the predictions of
our model, is expected to be positive and significant. Finally, Xikd is a set of some controls that
we use in order to deal with possible confounds and aid the interpretation of the test results as a
sign of economies of density. In different specifications, we allow Xikd to capture a variety of fixed
effects such as borough fixed effects, platform fixed effects, zone type fixed effects, year-month fixed
effects, and interactions among the above. Results of this regression analysis have been reported
in Table 1.
Table 1: Effect of dropoff density in a region on its relative outflow (i.e., pickups per dropoff) is always positive and significant.
This is robust to a rich set of fixed effects specifications.
Dependent variable: log relative outflow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log dropoff density 0.072∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed Effects† Constant B P Z B×P×Z
Observations 21,357 21,357 21,357 21,357 21,357
R2 0.299 0.378 0.385 0.369 0.495
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.377 0.385 0.369 0.494
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†: P:Platform, B:Borough, Z:Zone-type
Table 1 shows that the coefficient of interest, α, is always positive and significant under multiple
fixed effects specifications. The simplest column to interpret in this table is column (1) which
pertains to the specification with no fixed effects. The positive and significant estimate for α in
this column simply means D←ikd and ROikd are positively correlated across observations. We start
by discussing the result in this column under a fairly strong assumption; and then we move to a
discussion of other columns which help weaken our assumption.
Initially, we interpret our assumption of “for every ride there is a ride back by the same person
shortly before or after” to mean:
λ̄→ikd ≡ λ̄←ikd (6)
where λ̄→ikd is the potential demand for rides with platform k that exit i during period d (a





as “access to outgoing rides from i with k during d” and similarly use the notation







This means a high ROikd is a sign that access to rides that originate in i and end elsewhere is
higher than access to rides that originate elsewhere and end in i. If we take this interpretation,
then column (1) of Table 1 demonstrates that a higher density of dropoffs in region i is associated
with higher access to rides in that area, relative to the rest of the city.
Although we agree that eq. (6) imposes a strong assumption, we note that eq. (6) is not necessary
for the interpretation of results once we have the right controls in place. The following proposition
further clarifies this point.
Proposition 8. Suppose that vector Q is a partition of all ikd observations in the data based on
some characteristics.9 Also suppose that
λ̄→ikd
λ̄←ikd
depends only on characteristics Q. That is, for some





Under these conditions, the following regression will lead to the exact same estimated α as




) = α log(D←ikd) + βXikd + εikd (8)
The proof can be found in the appendix. Proposition 8 shows that Xikd helps not only with
controlling for omitted factors that may be impacting access to rides, but also with correcting for
possible error in measurement of
A→ikd
A←ikd
using ROikd. In these ways, the controls help rule out a
number of possible alternative hypotheses to the effect of density on access. For instance, it is in
principle possible (though not likely) that Manhattan provides worse public transit options than
the outer boroughs, prompting passengers to turn to rideshare. This can lead to λ̄→ikd > λ̄
←
ikd when i
is in Manhattan, implying that a higher relative outflow in Manhattan is just an artefact of higher
demand for (rather than better access to) rideshare there. This issue, as Proposition 8 shows, can




In addition, there are alternative hypotheses to the role of economies of density, even if λ̄→ikd =
λ̄←ikd. For instance, it is conceivable that the overall balance of flows of rides on a daily or monthly
level gets impacted not by differential densities but by the hourly level complexities in the movement
of passengers within the city. As an example, in the morning there is a net flow of passengers from
9To illustrate, if Q partitions the data based on borough and platform, it means ∀ ikd& i′k′d′ : Qikd = Qi′k′d′ if
and only if k = k′ and regions i and i′ are within the same borough.
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the outer boroughs toward Manhattan when individuals commute to work. In the afternoon, the
flow is reversed when they return home. Thus, if supply of rideshare is more limited in the morning
compared to the evening (e.g., perhaps because some rideshare drivers are at their “first jobs” in
the morning), then this can explain why access to rideshare –and, hence, the relative outflow of
rides– is higher in Manhattan independently of density. Adding proper controls will help with these
types of alternative hypotheses as well.
The variations that our robustness columns (i.e., (2) through (5)) in Table 1 leverage should
help alleviate concerns about the aforementioned alternative hypotheses (as well as other possible
ones). For instance, a model with borough fixed effects would estimate α only based on within-
borough variation in relative outflows as a function of dropoff density, which would not pick up
differences between Manhattan and the outer boroughs. Likewise, a zone-type fixed effects model
would estimate α from the variation in dropoff density among regions that are of the same type
(e.g., residential). To illustrate, recall Fig. 4. A regression with zone-type fixed effects compares
overall relative outflows between the two residential zones Alphabet City (panel b) and Riverdale
(panel c) to each other in order to infer α, the effect of dropoff density; but it does not compare
either of the two to Greenwhich Village (panel a) which is mostly commercial. A regression that
interacts zone type and borough level fixed effects will only use comparisons among zones that are
of the same type and are within the same borough. A model that interacts these fixed effects with
platform fixed effects (i.e. column (5) in Table 1) allows the zone-borough effect to be platform
specific.
We would like to add that in fact Manhattan has a higher relative outflow in spite of having a
concentration of commercial areas rather than because of it. To see this, we note that in column (4)
of Table 1, the fixed effects coefficient on commercial areas (not reported in the table) comes back
smaller than those of the other zone types (i.e., residential, manufacturing, and park). This means
all else (including density of dropoffs) equal, a commercial area is expected to have a lower relative
outflow for rideshare compared to other zone types. We believe this should not be surprising given
the relative abundance of non-rideshare options in commercial areas.
Other robustness checks. The fixed effects specifications shown in Table 1 are only a subset
of those we examined. In particular, we examined interacting all of the fixed effects columns in that
table with year-month (YM) fixed effects. The most general case (i.e., B×P×Z×YM) would have
about 1600 separate fixed effects. Under all of our additional regressions, the result was robust. the
results also seem robust to functional form assumptions (we tried using the relative outflow itself
instead of the log and all results were robust). Finally, we ran the model with only subsets of the
full data by taking one platform off each time. Again, α always came back positive and significant.
Before closing this section, we test another prediction by the model. Our model predicts that
the positive effect of density Di on access Ai diminishes as Di grows large enough. Again directly
testing this is not feasible given Ai and Di are both unobservable due to unobservability of λ̄i.
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Therefore, again, we test this in the context of the relationship between ROi and D
←
i . To this end,
we change the regression in eq. (5) by adding log(D←i )
2 as another regressor:
log(ROikd) = α1 log(D
←
ikd) + α2 log(D
←
ikd)
2 + βXikd + εikd (9)
If our model’s prediction of diminishing sensitivity to density is empirically relevant, we should
expect a positive α1 and a negative α2 in the estimation results.
10 As Table 2 shows, the empirical
results are robustly in line with the model prediction.
Table 2: A square density term added to regressions in Table 1. The effect of the square density term is robustly negative
and significant, in line with model predictions.
Dependent variable: log relative outflow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log dropoff density 0.327∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
(log dropoff density)2 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Fixed Effects† Constant B P Z B×P×Z
Observations 21,357 21,357 21,357 21,357 21,357
R2 0.342 0.408 0.415 0.406 0.495
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.407 0.415 0.406 0.494
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†: P:Platform, B:Borough, Z:Zone-type
Next, we turn to testing for the role of market thickness in determining the spatial distribution
of supply.
4.3 Testing for the Role of Market Thickness (i.e., Platform Size) in Economies
of Density
A second crucial prediction of our model was that the gap between access to rides in busy areas and
access to rides in less busy areas is wider for smaller platforms. To this end, we run a regression
on rideshare platforms’ rides in NYC at the borough level. Specifically, we analyze the following
specification:
10A more precise test of diminishing sensitivity of access to density would use D←ikd and D
←2
ikd in the regression
rather than log(D←ikd) and log(D
←
ikd)
2. Nevertheless, we used the latter to keep eq. (9) compatible with eq. (5). We
have examined the regression with D←ikd and D
←2
ikd and the results were robust.
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ROikd = α0 + α1 log(ρi) + α2 log(Skd) + α3 log(Skd) log(ρi) + νikd (10)
where ROikd is the relative outflow for platform k at borough i on date d (note that this regression,
compared to previous ones, is coarser on i but finer on d). Also ρi is the population density of
borough i.11 Finally, Skd is the size of platform k on date d, which is measured by the total number
of rides given by that platform in NYC during the month in which date d occurs. Tables (3) and (4)
report the results from this regression. The first table reports results when we either do not include
any fixed effects in the regression or we do have fixed effects but they are not interacted (that
is, platform fixed effects, year-month fixed effects, or borough fixed effects). Table 4 incorporates
a richer set of fixed effects. It starts, in its first three columns, with fixed effects on (i) platform
interacted by year-month, (ii) borough interacted by platform, and (iii) borough interacted by year-
month. It then incorporates these three pairs into one single regression. Finally, the last column
has interaction fixed effects among boroughs, platforms, and years (not year-month in this column).
The coefficient of interest is α3, the interaction coefficient between platform size and borough
population density. Based on the predictions of our theoretical model, we would expect a negative
estimated value for α3, indicating that as a platform gets smaller, access to its supply in lower
density areas falls further behind that in denser areas. As can be seen from tables (3) and (4), this
is exactly the result that we get from the empirical analysis and it is robust the controls.
We end this subsection by emphasizing (without introducing a formal proposition) that, similar
to regression eq. (5), regression eq. (10) does not require the assumption in eq. (6) for ROikd to be
interpreted as a representation of access to rides in i relative to outside of i. A similar proposition
to Proposition 8 can be proven showing that, with the right controls, α3 remains intact if one
replaces ROikd in the left hand side of eq. (10) with
A→ikd
A←ikd
. Moreover, note that our coefficient of
interest in this section is different from that in the previous section. Here we are interested in α3,
the interaction coefficient between platform size and borough population density. Therefore, even




be region-specific as long as it is not region-platform specific. In other words, even if things such
as availability of public transportation options can create an imbalance on the flow of rides to and
from a region i, it should not impact α3 (even if we do not use additional controls) as long as
public transportation options are assumed to create the same amount of flow imbalance in i for all
platforms.
To see how these controls help rule out alternative hypotheses, we review two such alternatives.
First, in principle it might be that Lyft has lower relative outflows in the outer regions because
Lyft drivers are more likely to live in busier areas and, hence, prefer to driver there. Column 2 of
11In this section, we use population density instead of dropoffs density. Population densities allow us to define busier
and less busy regions in a way that is constant across platforms and time. This allows us to focus on cross-platform
(and within-platform over time) comparisons in size as they impact the spatial distribution of relative outflows.
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Table 3: Relative Outflow regression with single fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is the interaction coefficient which
is robustly negative and significant.
Dependent variable: Relative Outflow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(population density) 2.154∗∗∗ 2.222∗∗∗ 2.141∗∗∗ -
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
log(size) 0.492∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
log(population density)×
log(size) −0.126∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Fixed Effects† Constant P YM B
Observations 7,709 7,709 7,709 7,709
R2 0.595 0.624 0.598 0.725
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†: P:Platform, B:Borough, YM:Year-Month
Table 4: Relative Outflow regression with interaction Fixed Effects. The coefficient of interest is the interaction coefficient
which is robustly negative and significant.
Dependent variable: Relative Outflow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(population density) 2.182∗∗∗ - - - -
(0.040)
log(size) - 0.596∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ - 0.402∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.008) (0.061)
log(population density)×
log(size) −0.128∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.393∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.023) (0.018)
Fixed Effects† P ×YM B ×P B × YM (P × YM) P × B × Y
+(P × B)+(B × YM)
Observations 7,709 7,709 7,709 7,709 7,709
R2 0.629 0.829 0.738 0.841 0.835
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†: P:Platform, B:Borough, YM:Year-Month, Y:Year
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Table 4 rules this out by exploiting only within-platform variation in each borough. Such variation
can be seen in Fig. 3 as well: Lyft’s relative outflows become more balanced geographically as it
grows in size. A second, more important, possible issue is the fact that Via is a much different
platform in structure than Uber and Lyft; therefore, its more concentrated relative outflows may
be a consequence of its different structure rather than its size. Again, our controls that exploit only
within-platform variation in each borough show that Via’s possible differences from Uber and Lyft
is not the main driver of our results.
Finally, in addition to the arguments above, Fig. 5 should be useful in illustrating that our
results are not an artifact of a differences in the hourly transportation patterns of the users of these
platforms. As can be seen in the figure, comparisons among different platforms’ relative outflows
in Staten Island is remarkably consistent over time of day, both during July 2017 and a year later.
This rules out the possibility that, for instance, Lyft had a lower relative outflow in Staten Island
in July 2017 because Lyft users tended to need to exit that region at certain times of the day when
rideshare was less available relative to other options.
4.4 Other Evidence for Model Predictions
Evidence for importance of pickup times. The tests we provided in this section all pertained
to what the model predicted for the equilibrium of the market. We did not provide tests for the
mechanisms through which the model predicts those outcomes should arise. In particular, both of
the predictions of the model (i.e., (i) access gap between high and low density areas, and (ii) the gap
being larger for smaller platforms) arise in the model because drivers care about the pickup-time
differences across different regions. We did not provide direct evidence that drivers do indeed take
pickup time differences into account when deciding where to operate. Nevertheless, there indeed
exists evidence that drivers care about pickup times, and that this consideration by drivers can
impact the overall spatial distribution of supply. Here, we discuss two such sources of evidence.
First, there is anecdotal evidence from online rideshare forums that (i) drivers are dis-satisfied
with Lyft’s long pickup times in suburbs, (ii) they believe Uber has the same issue but not to the
same extent, and (iii) they are less likely to not drive for Lyft in suburbs due to this matter. All
of these are in line with our model predictions (both in terms of the outcome and in terms of the
mechanism). There are also several news articles pointing to similar mechanisms that our model
puts forth (such as rideshare drivers “cruising” in lower and mid Manhattan, accepting long idle
times in search for pickups that are nearby). We provide some pieces of such anecdotal evidence in
the appendix of the paper.
Second, we have analyzed data from “Ride Austin,” a non-for-profit rideshare platform in the
city of Austin. That dataset allows for measuring pickup times across different regions in the city
and analyzing drivers’ behavior at an individual level in response to pickup times (while controlling
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for possible confounds such as idle time, price, and region and time fixed effects). We find evidence
that pickup times are a first order issue in drivers’ decision making on where (not) to operate. This
analysis is not included in the paper but will be available upon request.12
Note on possible role of competitive forces. We finish this section by briefly arguing
against the hypothesis that the observed cross-platform geographical differences in access to supply
is an artifact of platforms’ strategic spatial positioning to avoid competition from one another (i.e.,
tacit collusion). There are multiple arguments against the role of competitive forces in shaping the
observed spatial differences. First, if competitive forces pushed the platforms to each focus on some
areas and be less accessible in other areas, then we would see a different “area of focus” for each
platform. However, in the data, all platforms are more accessible in busier regions compared to the
outer areas; it is just the extent of the difference between more and less busy regions that differs
by platform.13 Second, if the platforms were trying to position away from each other, an obvious
tool for them to carry this out would be prices. Nevertheless, we know that Via had uniform prices
across regions. Also, Uber and Lyft had similar spatial pricing (as we will discuss later) especially
in Staten Island, which is where their relative outflows differed the most.
5 Implications
Our empirical analysis in Section 4 tests the relevance of our theoretical model in Section 3. Based
on the empirical results, we indeed find the theory and its possible implications empirically relevant.
Thus, this section discusses those implications for business strategy and public policy.
5.1 Business Strategy
Regarding business strategy implications of our works, we make three notes. First, we discuss the
implications for surge pricing. Next, we discuss how our analysis relates to the optimal spatial
incentive scheme by rideshare platforms. Finally, we use data on surge multipliers and ETAs from
NYC to briefly examine whether platforms’ strategies are in line with recommendations of our
model.
Surge Pricing. Comparing our theoretical results to other papers on surge pricing such as
Castro et al. (2018) leads to an important implication for surge pricing as it relates to recurrent
versus temporary shocks to demand. Under a temporary positive shock to demand –such as the end
of a sports event– in region i, the platform should raise the regional price and driver wage in order
12It is worth noting that, in the Austin dataset, too, relative outflows are larger in areas with higher deropoff
densitties, exactly as our theoretical model would predict.
13Also, if the platforms were dividing the market among themselves, it would be more natural to expect larger
platforms such as Uber to claim more attractive markets such as Manhattan. However, Via’s supply is showing the
highest degree of concentration in the Manhattan area.
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to encourage drivers to relocate to i. Castro et al. (2018) even recommend that the platform reduce
wages in some other locations to speed up the process of relocation to i. Our model abstracts away
from temporary shocks. Recurring demand shocks such as rush-hours, however, are different in that
it is reasonable to assume drivers (i) know about them and (ii) can predict that other drivers respond
to them. Under these assumptions, our model would suggest that platforms should not do surge
pricing during rush hours. In fact, our model points out that high demand leads to economies of
density which is attractive to drivers due to shorter pickup times. Consequently, platforms can even
reduce driver wages during rush hours, effectively charging drivers for the provision of economies
of density. Platforms can then pass on some of this cost saving to passengers in order to get
even more demand and strengthen the local economies of density. Of course this recommendation
hinges on at multiple assumptions that our model in Section 3 is making. First, we abstract away
from congestion. Second, as mentioned before, our model assumes drivers know about the lower
pickup times in region i. Third, our model assumes that higher demand only means a scale-up
in the demand curve and does not involve a change in the price elasticity. If either of these two
assumptions is violated, then it may still be in a rideshare platform’s interest to raise the prices
and wages during rush hours. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, we assume c̄ is homogeneous
across drivers. If drivers are substantially heterogeneous in their reservation values c̄, then it may
make sense to increase wages during rush hours in order to encourage drivers with higher c̄ to join
the market.
Optimal Spatial Pricing Scheme. Proposition 7 characterizes the optimal spatial price
and wage policy by the platform. It describes the overall form of the optimal spatial strategy
in the presence of opposing economic forces presented by Proposition 5 and Proposition 6. Our
Proposition 7 states that the platform’s optimal strategy would entail offering higher driver wages
in sparser regions (unless they are too sparse). This is in line with the “pickup time bonus” policy
(i.e., paying drivers for longer pickups) which some platforms have recently adopted in some (but
not all) markets. To our knowledge, platforms pass on the full bonus to passengers. Proposition 7,
however, recommends that the platform should pay for part of this bonus (i.e., pass-through should
be less than 1). Footing part of this bill, according to our model, would be an investment by the
platform into building economies of density in sparser regions: any driver who chooses to drive in a
less busy area will slightly decrease the pickup time in that area, thereby encouraging more drivers
to locate there without requiring additional bonus from the platform.
Do Platforms Behave as Our Model Recommends? Our main theory results were ag-
glomeration of supply in denser regions due to economies of density, and the agglomeration being
more pronounced for smaller platforms. We showed that both of these results hold no matter
whether the platform is intervening through wages and prices or not. Therefore, our empirical
tests corroborating the aforementioned two theory results do not provide information on what the
platform strategies must have looked like. In other words, our tests so far do not inform us whether
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Figure 6: Average ETAs for Lyft and Uber from late May till mid June 2016 in 195 locations in NYC. Panel (a) exhibits
Lyft’s ETA while panel (b) shows ubers. Panel (c) compares the two by showing log(
ETALyft
ETAUber
). It uses pink whenever the
fraction is negative, meaning the Lyft app is announcing a faster ETA. It uses black otherwise. It uses blue dots when the
difference between the two platforms is not significant at the 99.9% level. The observation that Lyft arrives faster in most of
the city may be an artifact of the difference between the two apps’ algorithms for calculating the ETA. However, the “difference

















































the observed level of agglomeration in the market is the at efficient level (i.e., it is an outcome of
mitigating platform intervention) or at an excessive level. Gaining further insight into this requires
prices and wages data during the same time period as our rides data. Unfortunately such data is
not available to us. However, we have data from Uber’s and Lyft’s surge multipliers and estimated
arrival times (ETAs) recorded every 30 minutes in 195 locations across NYC from late May to
mid June of 2016.14 The surge multiplier data is especially informative given that, at the time,
both Uber and Lyft operated in a commission based manner. This means the ride price and the
driver wage were both multiplied by the same surge factor which we observe. Therefore, the spatial
distribution of surge multipliers represents both that of prices and wages (given that the “base
rates” for both companies were spatially uniform). Figures 6 and 7 summarise these data.
As Fig. 6 shows, both platforms have ETAs for passengers (which could be thought of as pickup
times for drivers) that increase as we move from busier areas to less busy ones. It also shows that
the rate of increase in the ETA as we move outward is larger for Lyft than it is for Uber (both of
these patterns are consistent with our model).
Figure 7 suggests that the platforms’ pricing strategies were not in full accordance with what
our model recommends. Both platforms tend to charge higher prices and pay higher wages in busier
regions, which is the opposite to what we saw in Proposition 7.15 Also, the very notion of surge
pricing in a commission based manner goes against Proposition 7 because multiplying both prices
14Our “Ride Austin” data has price information for the same duration as the rides data. Analyzing that data
shows a very similar pricing pattern to what we observe here from Uber and Lyft.
15Again, whether platforms should change their pricing strategies to fully adhere to what Proposition 7 recommends
depends, among other things, on how heterogeneous c̄ is across drivers.
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Figure 7: Average surge multipliers for Lyft and Uber from late May till mid June 2016 in 195 locations in NYC. Panel (a)
exhibits Lyft’s surge (or, in Lyft’s terms, “prime time”) multiplier while panel (b) shows Ubers. Panel (c) compares the two
by showing surgeLyft − surgeUber. It uses pink wherever the difference, meaning the Lyft app is announcing a higher surge
factor. It uses black otherwise. It uses blue dots when the difference between the two platforms is not significant at the 99.9%
level. As can be seen in this figure, both platforms charge higher prices and pay higher wages in busier regions (This happens
only in busiers times of day. The default rates are geographically uniform for both platforms). In addition, the notion of surge
pricing by multiplying both the price and the wage by the same factor leads to a passthrough higher than one, which is not in















































and wages by the same factor means a pass-through that is larger than one; whereas our model
suggests a less than 100% passthrough when examining the spatial comparison of prices and wages.
In addition to surge pricing, platforms have adopted other, more sophisticated, means to conduct
spatial price and wage discrimination. One such scheme is “pickup time bonus,” an additional
payout offered to drivers for driving longer for pickups. Uber and Lyft both implement some
version of this policy in a select set of markets across the U.S. Uber’s takes the form of a payout
for a pickup that takes longer than 11 minutes. Lyft’s takes the form of starting the clock for the
driver’s pay from the time she gets dispatched rather than the time she picks the passenger up. As
mentioned before, to our knowledge, both platforms charge the full bonus to the passenger, which
we believe disregards the externality effects. In addition, Lyft’s policy of paying the driver as much
for driving to a pickup location as it pays for carrying the passenger is not fully congruent with our
model’s results. Our model says that the platform would optimally want to mitigate rather than
fully eliminate drivers’ avoidance of long pickups.
We finish by noting that the purpose of this analysis of surge multipliers and ETAs was not to
claim that the platforms’ pricing strategy is incorrect per se (because there may be factors platforms
are considering in their pricing that are outside the scope of our model). The purpose was, rather,
to shed some light on platforms’ pricing behavior through the lens of our model.
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5.2 Public Policy
Containment of the growth of rideshare platforms has been a ongoing policy debate in the city of
New York. Multiple policies –such as direct caps on the number of rideshare driver licences issued,
a minimum wage, or congestion taxes– have proposed and there has been opposing reactions from
different stakeholders (these proposals and reactions to them may be found in numerous media
articles on this issue. Examples are The New York Times (2019b, 2018, 2019a); The Washington
Post (2018); Wired (2019); The Hill (2019); The Verge (2018); Tech Crunch (2018); The Tech
Crunch (2019)). While there are possible benefits from controlling the sizes of rideshare platforms
–such as less congestion–, our analysis in this paper points out that there is a potential unintended
consequence from such policies that has to do with the role of market thickness and that has been
overlooked: a smaller platform size (i.e., thinner market) incentivizes drivers to avoid the outer
areas.16
Related to this issue, we answer an interesting question motivated by our theoretical analysis.
Our theoretical results show that geographical inequity in access to supply diminishes as platform
size becomes infinitely large due to the fact that pickup times lose their importance against idle
times. In a sense, this implies that if the platform size is “large enough,” then geographical inequity
will not be a first order concern. A practical question is how large is this “large enough” size? To
find out, we modify regression equation (10), replacing the log function applied to platform size by
a function that satiates to an upper limit as the platform size increases.
We implement this by using log(min(aMax,#Rides)) instead of log(#Rides), where aMax is
the parameter capturing the adequate size and is to be estimated (one could interpret aMax as the
size at which the impact of size on the geo-distribution of relative outflows becomes small enough
so that it cannot be distinguished from noise). We choose this way of capturing the adequate size
over adopting a functional form that converges smoothly as size grows. The reason behind this
choice is that we want the identification of the adequate size to come mainly from the data points
at which relative outflows stop responding to platform size, as opposed to the data points at which
the platform size is well below the upper limit.17 The regression equation implementing this notion
16It might seem at first that “multi-homing” (i.e., the phenomenon of drivers working for multiple platforms (Bryan
and Gans, 2019)) might mitigate the excess clustering of supply of small platforms in busier areas, because drivers
working for multiple platforms are, in effect, working for one large rideshare system. We note, however, that, for
multi-homing to mitigate agglomeration, it must be that the matching systems across platforms are fully integrated.
This would imply, for instance, that a Lyft driver would not get asked to pick up a passenger who is far away, if there
is an Uber driver in the vicinity of that passenger. We believe that in reality, the integration of matching systems
is substantially less than perfect, rendering multi-homing less impactful on the extent of agglomeration. Indeed, if
multi-homing could eliminate agglomeration, it should have balanced out the relative outflows of the platforms, which
is not what we observe in Figures 3, 4, 5, and 12.
17The identification comes from the size at which Lyft’s spatial distribution of relative outflows (i) substantially
slows down in its response to Lyft’s growth in size and (ii) satiates to a distribution that looks very close to that of
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is very similar to the earlier regression Eq. (10) on relative outflows, with the difference being the
inclusion of aMax. Equation (11) describes this regression:
ROikd = α0 + α1 log(ρi) + α2 log(min(aMax, Skd)) + α3 log(min(aMax, Skd)) log(ρi) + νikd (11)
In order to make sure that the functional form of log is not substantially impacting our estimate
of aMax, we also estimate a version in which the size itself, as opposed to its natural log, is used.
Equation (12) represents this:
ROikd = α0 + α1 log(ρi) + α2 min(aMax, Skd) + α3 min(aMax, Skd) log(ρi) + νikd (12)
Regressions (11) and (12) are estimated using non-linear least squares, and the results are
reported in Table (5). The adequate size parameter, aMax is estimated at 3.65M rides/month using
regression (11) and at 3.30M rides/month using regression (12). Both estimates are statistically
very significant. They are also fairly close to each other, suggesting the robustness of aMax to the
model specification, as we expected.
These results suggest that NYC needs to use caution if it were to downsize Lyft and, especially,
Via. Uber, on the other hand will not face distorted geographical supply distribution if downsized.
We note that given a similar dataset to what we used here, the method we laid out in this section
can help identify aMax in any other metropolitan area.
6 Discussion: Evidence of Economies of Density in the Taxicab
Market?
We conjecture that economies of density also exist in the taxicab market and that they lead to
agglomeration of supply in busier regions. Our theoretical model, however, does not directly speak
to the taxicab market. Our model assumes a central dispatch structure for the matching of drivers
to riders; and one of the key forces behind our results is the pickup time. In the taxi market, on
the other hand, there are search frictions; but once a cab and a passenger find each other, they are
not far apart (i.e., no pickup time).
Unlike our theory model, our empirical approach (i.e., relative outflows analysis) can be applied
regardless of the type of the matching mechanism in the market. Thus, we perform it on data on
Yellow Taxi rides in NYC during January 2009 (which is the first month for which data on taxicab
rides are available from the TLC website) to gain insight into whether economies of density are
at work there. Fig. 8 suggests a strong positive association between relative outflows ROi and
dropoffs densities D←i across regions i. Strikingly, numerous zones in the outer boroughs have
relative outflows that are below 10%. This means in those regions (which are regions with smaller
Uber.
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Table 5: Results of regressions (11) and (12). The main coefficient of interest is aMax, the adequate size for a rideshare
platform to contain geographical inequity in supply.
Dependent variable: Relative Outflow
(1) (2)















Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
38
Figure 8: Dropoff densities in panel (a) and relative outflows in panel (b) by taxi zone across NYC for Yellow Cab rides
during January 2009 (before Green Taxi was launched to serve the outer boroughs). The two quantities seem spatially highly




















dropoff rates per square mile), more than 90% of those who enter using a taxi ride end up exiting
using a different transportation option.
Next, we carry out the same regression analysis as in eq. (5) for Yellow Taxi rides. The results,
under all regression specifications with regards to borough and zone type come back positive and
significant. Also the magnitude is much higher compared to the results in Table 1, suggesting a
stronger economies of density effect in the taxicab market compared to the rideshare market.
Our results in this section suggest that economies of density, and the agglomeration that it
leads to, have an important role in shaping the spatial distribution of supply in the taxicab market
(Note that January 2009 was before “Green Taxis” were established. Thus, the lower access to
yellow taxis in the outer boroughs cannot be because of the presence of green taxis). This points to
a future research direction on the modeling and empirical analysis of transportation markets with
decentralized matching systems such as taxi cabs: the incorporating of economies of density and its
implications. Much of the literature on transportation markets with decentralized matching (e.g.,
Lagos (2000, 2003); Buchholz (2018); Brancaccio et al. (2019a,c)) is built on the assumption that
the “matching function” between passengers and drivers is homogeneous of degree one. That is,
the number of rides originated in region i doubles if both the number of passengers searching for
drivers and the number of drivers searching for passengers in i double. This abstracts away from
economies of density. This would likely lead to an attribution of the relative outflows patterns in
Figure 8 to substantially lower need for cab rides entering Manhattan than rides exiting it.18
18If the matching-function-inversion approach from this literature is applied to recover search volumes for rides
across regions, we would indeed conjecture that the result would point to fewer searches for rides from the outer
regions. We would like to emphasize, however, that fewer searches do not necessarily indicate lower potential demand.
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Table 6: Results from regressing relative outflows on dropoff densities for yellow taxi rides in January 2009 (before the green
taxi program started). The regression specification is the same as eq. (5). Similar to the results from the same regression on
rideshare data, here too the coefficient α on dropoff density is positive and significant and this is robust to different fixed effects
specifications. The magnitude of the estimated α is much higher here compared to rideshare, suggesting more pronounced
economies of density in the taxicab market.
Dependent variable: log relative outflow
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log dropoff density 0.184∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.039) (0.024) (0.041)
Fixed Effects† Constant B Z B×Z
Observations 194 194 194 194
R2 0.233 0.833 0.792 0.839
Adjusted R2 0.229 0.828 0.786 0.819
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†: B:Borough, Z:Zone-type
Capturing economies of density in decentralized transportation markets (i.e., allowing the num-
ber of matches in a region to more than double if demand and supply both double) will also have
policy implications. This is because the policy maker may have an incentive to encourage supply
in sparer areas in an effort to build economies of density there, whereas individual taxi drivers will
not have the same incentive (they do not internalize the density-related externality they leave on
others). This incentive mis-alignment in the taxi market will require remedies, which will likely
take a similar form to the theoretical results in our rideshare model, and are worth further studying
both theoretically and empirically.
7 Conclusion
This paper examined the effects of economies of density and market thickness on spatial distribution
of supply. We focused on ridesharing and analyzed this market both theoretically and empirically.
Theoretically, we showed that, at the equilibrium, regions with higher densities of potential demand
get more supply–even after normalizing by their higher demand–compared to lower density regions.
We showed that this “spatial skew” of supply from demand is more intense for smaller platforms.
Finally, we showed that a rideshare platform’s optimal pricing strategy would involve mitigating,
In fact, based on our relative outflows analysis, those fewer searches would at least in part indicate that potential
riders in outer regions forgo searches for taxicabs in anticipation of their likely failure.
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but not fully eliminating, the spatial mismatch between supply and demand. The lack of full
alignment between the equilibrium driver distribution (if the platform does not intervene) on the
one hand and the platform’s optimal distribution on the other comes from externalities that drivers
leave on each other which the platform internalizes.
On the empirical side, we devised a method with simple implementation and limited data re-
quirements to detect a mismatch between supply and demand in passenger transportation markets.
Our method, “relative outflows analysis,” can be applied to all passenger transportation markets
regardless of whether the matching technology is centralized (e.g., rideshare) or decentralized (e.g.,
taxicabs). We applied our method to the rideshare market in NYC and tested the implications of
our theory model. We found evidence that access to supply is indeed skewed toward higher density
areas and that the skew is more pronounced for smaller platforms.
We also discussed the implications of our model for business strategy and public policy. We
argued that, according to our model, surge pricing should not be done for recurring demand shocks
(such as rush hours) in the same way it is done for temporary shocks (such as the end of a sporting
event). We also argued that platforms should give bonuses to drivers for driving in sparser regions
but should avoid passing on the full bonus to passengers. Finally, we argued that breaking up
or downsizing a rideshare platform can have the unintended consequence of further incentivizing
drivers to operate in busier areas, thereby disproportionately hurting outer areas and suburbs.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in multiple directions. On the theoretical side, a
next step would be to extend the model to markets with decentralized matching such as the taxicab
market. Also, it would add value to investigate the role of platform competition in shaping the
spatial distribution of supply.
On the empirical side, an important next step would be to quantify the optimal (for a firm or
social planner) price and wage strategy in the presence of economies of density. Our theoretical
model shows that the platform’s optimal policy involves some incentives for drivers to operate in
less dense regions. But our paper does not empirically determine the exact magnitude of the price
and wage differences across regions. An empirical analysis providing such empirical recommenda-
tions would be of value especially if it captures economies of density alongside other mechanisms
that could bring about inefficiencies in the spatial distribution of drivers. Several papers that are
complementary to this paper point out mechanisms leading to inefficiencies in the distribution of
supply. For instance, Buchholz (2018) studies frictions arising from intra-day dynamics, and Bran-
caccio et al. (2019c) examine “pooling externalities.” A unified analysis comparing the magnitudes
among the efficiency effects of these mechanisms and economies of density could certainly enrich
our understanding of spatial markets.
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Appendices
This section provides six appendices. Appendix A provides anecdotal evidence for the relevance
of our model. Appendix B provides a micro foundation based on a circular city model for the
total wait time formula that we use throughout the paper. Appendix C gives the proofs for those
propositions in which the platform prices and wages are considered exogenous and uniform (i.e.,
Proposition 1 through Proposition 4). Appendix D supplies proofs for those propositions in which
platform pricecs and wages are determined optimally (i.e., Proposition 5 through Proposition 7).
Appendix E provides the proof to our proposition in the empirical section (i.e., Proposition 8).
Finally, Appendix F visualizes relative outflows at the borough level and discusses similarities
to/differences from the zone level relative outflows.
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A Anecdotal Evidence from Media and Online Forums
This appendix points to a list of anecdotal pieces of evidence (by no means exhaustive) from
online rideshare forums on how drivers complain about Lyft’s far pickups in suburbs and how they
recommend responding to it. The explanations in brackets within the quotations are from us.
• From the online forum “Uber People,”19 a thread in the Chicago section: The
title of the thread is “To those who drive Lyft in the suburbs.” The thread was started on
Dec 19 2016. The first post says “Are the ride requests you get on Lyft always seem to be far
away from you location? Seems like they are always 5 miles or more for the pickup location.
I got one for 12 miles last night. I drive in the Schaumburg/Palatine area [two northwestern
suburbs of Chicago about 30mi away from downtown].”
• From the same thread: “iDrive primarily in Palatine. about two out of every five ride
requests are for more than 10 minutes away. I ignore those”.
• From the same thread: “I was a victim of that once. Never again I take a ping more than
10 minutes away in the burbs”.
• From the same thread: “Yesterday was my 1st day on Lyft. Was visiting in Homer Glen
[a village about 30mi southwest of downtown Chicago] & decided to try Lyft for the first
time. First ping was 18 minutes away. Dang, I could make it 1/2 way downtown in that
time! I ignored the ride request. 2nd ping was also 18 minutes away. Lyft app complained
my acceptance rate is too low. I ignored the 2nd ping & went off-line.”
• From the same forum, a thread titled “First 3days of Lyft”: “If your area is spread
out...and you have to take those ¿ 10 minute requests, well...I might look for another job.”
• From the same thread: “Yeah, another (mostly) Lyft-specific problem, especially when
working in the suburbs, is you sometimes (fairly frequently, actually) receive trip requests
that are not close to your current location. I’ve received requests from passengers 20 miles
away.”
• From Chicago Tribune article titled “Lyft takes on Uber in suburbs”: Jean-Paul
Biondi, Chicago marketing lead for Lyft is quoted to explain the reason for Lyft’s planned
expansion into surburbs as follows “The main reason is we saw a lot of dropoffs in those
areas, but people couldn’t get picked up in those areas.” Which is in line with our reasoning
that small relative-outflow is a sign of potential demand which does not get served due to
under-supply.
19In spite of what the name suggests, this is a general ridesharing forum, not exclusively about Uber.
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• From the rideshare website “Become a Rideshare Driver”: It says successful Lyft
drivers use the following strategy:
– “The drivers usually run the Lyft app exclusively when they are in the busy downtown
or city areas.”
– “Usually in the suburbs, Uber is busier than Lyft, and in such areas, the drivers run
both the Uber and Lyft apps.”
B Micro Foundation for the Total Wait Time Formula
This section provides a simple micro-foundation for the total wait time formula eq. (1) using a
circular city model ala Salop. The circular model of regions is illustrated in Figure 9. The ni
drivers (in the figure, ni = 5) are placed on equidistant locations on the circumference.
20 Drivers
are matched to arriving passengers via a centralized matching system. Each driver’s “range” or
“catchment area” will be the arc consisting of all the points on the circle that are closer to that
driver than they are to any other driver in region i. Given that the total arrival rate in the region
is λi, the arrival rate in each driver’s catchment area is
λi
ni
. Each driver picks up the first passenger
that arrives within that driver’s catchment area. In practice, ridesharing platforms implement a
similar matching rule (Frechette et al. (2019) use a similar approach to model a centralized matching
market).
Suppose the time it takes a driver to travel a full circumference to pick up a passenger is t′.
The platform allocates an arriving customer to the closest driver. Because drivers are situated
at equidistant points on the circumference of the region, their catchment areas include half the
distance to their nearest neighbors on both sides. The idle time expected for a customer to arrive
in the driver’s area is niλi . The distance between drivers is
l
ni
where l is the circumference. Since
consumer location is uniform, the distance a consumer will be from the driver along the arc is
distributed d ∼ U [0, l2ni ], implying that the expected distance is E[d] =
l
4ni
. Thus, the expected

























where t = t
′
4 . This is exactly the same as eq. (1) except the notation on λi(pi) is suppressed to λi.
20While we do not model the locational choice of drivers within the region, it is fairly easy to see that equidistant
positioning location from neighbors is an equilibrium. While there might be other locational choices that might also
be equilibria, we focus on the equidistant positioning equilibrium.
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Figure 9: Illustration of Circular Model of each Region i and Driver Allocation
Driver 1
Driver 1's range
C Proofs for the results with fixed and uniform prices and wages
This section is organized as follows. In Appendix C.1 we build up a set of results that will later
be used in proving our propositions in the main text (under fixed and uniform prices and wages).
These preliminary results have two shortcomings. First, they are “all-regions equilibria,” meaning
equilibria in which each region gets a positive number of drivers. Second, they are developed
assuming size ti is homogeneous across all regions. After building up these preliminary results, our
next step in Appendix C.2 is to extend the analysis to multiple equilibria and provide proofs of the
propositions in the main text regarding driver behavior under fixed and uniform prices and wages
under homogeneous ti. Finally, in Appendix C.3, we show that once our propositions are true for
homogeneous ti, they are also true for heterogeneous ti.
C.1 Preliminary results
This section studies the market under fixed prices and wages and fixed N . In these circumstances,
for each region i, we have λi(p) = λ̄if(p) where p is the uniform price across regions. Therefore,
we will suppress the notation on prices and represent the arrival rate of demand in region i by λi
rather than λi(pi). This makes the primitives of the market (λ,N, t) where λ is the vector of all λi
demand arrival rates, N is the fixed total number of drivers, and t is the uniform region size which
is a scalar in this subsection but will be heterogeneous in Appendix C.3.
Definition 3. We say allocation n is under-supplied in region j, relative to region i, if we have















In general, when developing the preliminary results, we do not use the notation on access and
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work directly with ni and λi. In Appendix C.2 and Appendix C.3, we will see how these results
imply our results on access in the main text.
C.1.1 Statements of Preliminary Results when there are Only Two Regions
In this section, we present our results for the case of I = 2. We will present two results. First,
if the demand arrival rate in region 1 is strictly larger than that of region 2, then in any all-
regions equilibrium, region 2 will be strictly under-supplied. Second, we show that the under-supply
problem in region 2 is mitigated as the size of the platform increases, holding fixed the ratio between
λ1 and λ2.
First we give a result that helps to visually understand an all-regions equilibrium.
Proposition 9. At any all-regions equilibrium, the wait times in the two regions are equal. Also
the wait time for each region is locally increasing in the number of drivers present in that region.
Proof. If W1(n1) 6= W2(n2), then, given the wait time functions are continuous, a small mass
of drivers can relocate from the region with the higher wait time to the region with the lower wait





if at equilibrium, the wait time curve in region i is strictly decreasing, then a small mass of drivers
from region j can relocate to i and become strictly better off.
Next, we introduce a result that speaks to the existence and uniqueness of an all-regions equi-
librium.
Proposition 10. There is exactly one all-regions equilibrium if assumptions (A1) to (A3) hold.




















for j = 1, 2 and i = 3− j
Figure 10 visually illustrates Propositions 9 and 10. In each panel, the wait time curves for
the two regions are plotted opposite from each other. In each region, the wait time is initially
decreasing in the total number of drivers present in that region due to the decrease it causes in
pickup times. But as the region gets more drivers, the effect on pickup time dwindles and overall
wait time increases due to increased idle time for drivers.21 Each point on the horizontal axis
of the graph corresponds to a driver allocation between the two regions. One such point is the
“demand-proportional” allocation which satisfies n1λ1 =
n2
λ2
. This allocation is shown in the figure
21Total wait time curves being U-shaped has been mentioned in other studies (such as Castillo et al. (2017)). To
our knowledge, this curve and the U-shaped assumption on it are used by ride-share platforms in the determination
of various strategies including surge pricing.
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by a dashed vertical gray line. At each point, the solid blue line shows the total wait time in region
1, and the dashed green line gives the total wait time in region 2.
Translated to these graphical terms, Proposition 9 states that an all-regions equilibrium is a
point of intersection between the two wait-time curves, at which both curves are increasing. Among
the panels of Fig. 10, such equilibrium only exists in panel (c).22 Proposition 10 explains why. In
order for an all-regions equilibrium to exist, there should exist allocations for which the total wait
time at each region is increasing in the number of drivers present in that region. This is what
assumption (A1) requires. Graphically, the trough for the wait time curve in region 2 (emphasized
by a green circle) should be to the right of the trough of the wait time in region 1 (blue circle).
Panel (a) in Fig. 10 lacks this feature and, hence, also lacks an all-regions equilibrium. In addition
to (A1), the existence of an all-regions equilibrium would also require that the two wait-time curves
do intersect over the range in which they are both increasing. In order for this to happen, we require
assumptions (A2) and (A3). They require that, under the allocation that minimizes the total wait
time in region 1, the total wait time in region 2 be higher than that in region 1. They impose a
similar condition on the allocation that minimizes the total wait time in region 2. Graphically,
they require that the total-wait-time curve for region 2 (the green dashed line) be above the trough
of the wait-time curve in region 1 (the blue circle), and vice versa. Panel (c) satisfies both (A2)
and (A3) and, hence, has an all-regions equilibrium given by the intersection between the two
wait-time curves, emphasized by a large black circle. Panel (b), although satisfying (A1), has the
wait time curve for region 1 pass below the trough of the wait time curve in region 2. Therefore,
there is no all-regions equilibrium in panel (b).
The reason why different panels in Fig. 10 differ in terms of having an all-regions equilibrium is
that they pertain to different market primitives (λ,N, t) (in the figure as well as some of the proofs
in the appendix, instead of its components λ1 and λ2, the vector λ is represented by total demand
Λ = λ1 +λ2 and share of region 1 from demand φ =
λ1
Λ ). The figures are already suggestive of what
affects the existence of an all-regions equilibrium (e.g., a large enough N is necessary) or where
the all-regions equilibrium is located when it exists (to the right of the gray dashed line –i.e., the
demand-proportional allocation– instead of on it due to agglomeration of drivers in region 1). Our
next results in this section formalize and generalize such observations from the figure and add other
results describing the role of market thickness.




2) exists. In that
case, the all-regions equilibrium is strictly under-supplied in region 2:
22One can verify that in all panels of Fig. 10, allocations that put all drivers in one of the two regions are in fact
equilibria. To illustrate why, note that under allocation (n1, n2) = (N, 0), the wait time at region 2 is ∞ due to high
pickup time. Thus, no driver has an incentive to move from region 1 to region 2.
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Figure 10: Wait Time and Driver Allocation. An all-regions equilibrium exists only in panel (c)





























































(a) No All-Regions Equilibrium





























































(b) No All-Regions Equilibrium



































































To illustrate, if region 1 has 80% of the demand, then, in equilibrium, 90% of the drivers might
prefer to drive in region 1. This result coincides with our empirical observation that the relative
outflow was greater in busier areas than in less busy areas. This can be graphically seen in Fig. 10
panel (c): the equilibrium is to the right of the gray dashed line representing the proportional
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allocation.
We now turn to our second result which speaks to the impact of market thickness. We prove
that “making the market thicker” will decrease the extent of geographical inequity in supply. The
next two results show this, respectively, for thickening the market on both sides (increasing the
number of drivers and all-regional demand arrival rates) and thickening it on one side (increasing
the number of drivers only).




2) is the all-regions EQ under (λ1, λ2, N, t).
Consider scaling up the platform size by γ > 1 to (λ′1, λ
′
2, N
′, t) = (γλ1, γλ2, γN, t). Under these





N In particular, as γ →∞,the relative under-supply in region 2, κ21, tends to zero.
Our next proposition proves similar results to those shown in Proposition 12, but this time for
thickening the market only on one side.




2) is the all-regions EQ under (λ1, λ2, N, t). If we
scale up to (λ1, λ2, N
′, t) for some N ′ > N , then an all-regions equilibrium still exists. Also, the new
equilibrium shows less under-supply of rides in region 2. In particular, as N ′ → ∞, under-supply
in region 2 (and in region 1) tends to zero.
C.1.2 Statements of Preliminary Results when there are I ≥ 2 Regions
Our main result in this section extends all of the results presented so far from two regions to any
number of regions I ≥ 2. This theorem is powerful in that it provides, among other results, a
description of how the market responds to a changed thickness, at the most granular level. That is,
it describes what happens to the supply ratio between any two regions i, j. As formalized below,
the proposition shows that the market responds to a “global thinning” by further agglomerating
the supply at the thickest “local markets.”
Theorem 1. In the general version of the game (i.e., I ≥ 2), the following statements are true:
1. For an all-regions equilibrium, the total wait time is equal across all I regions. Also, at the
equilibrium allocation, the total-wait-time curve for any region is strictly increasing in the
number of drivers present in that region.
2. Any all-regions equilibrium n∗ = (n∗1, ..., n
∗
I) is unique.







. The inequality is strict if and
only if λi > λj .
4. Suppose an all regions equilibrium n∗ = (n∗1, ..., n
∗
I) exists under primitives (λ,N, t) where
λ = (λ1, ..., λI). Then, if supply and demand both scale up, that is, under new primitives
(γλ, γN, t) with γ > 1, we have:
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• An all-regions equilibrium n∗′ = (n∗′1 , ..., n∗
′
I ) exists.
• The new equilibrium n∗′ shows less geographical supply inequity than n∗ in the sense














. Both inequalities are strict if and only if









tend to 1 as γ →∞
5. The same statement is true if instead of proportionally scaling up both λ and N , we scale up
only N .
C.1.3 Proofs of Preliminary Results
Proof of Proposition 10. First, we prove the necessity part, and then sufficiency and uniqueness.
Necessity: We prove necessity of (A1)-(A3) by contradiction. First, if (A1) is not satisfied, then
we show that the wait time curves can only intersect when at least one of them is decreasing.
To see this, note that taking the first order condition on eq. (1) shows the wait time curve
in each region i is minimized at nmini =
√
λit. Thus, condition (A1) simply requires that
N ≥ nmin1 + nmin2 . Without (A1), there would be no possible allocation of drivers under
which the total wait time in each region is increasing in the number of drivers present in
that region. Therefore, by Proposition 9, there would be no all-regions equilibrium. Next,
suppose condition (A2) were not true. Thus, at the minimum wait time for region 1, i.e. at
the allocation (n1 = n
min
1 , n2 = N − nmin1 ), the wait time for region 1 is higher than region
2. Thus, the wait time curves can only intersect in the decreasing region for market 1, which
we know cannot be an all-regions equilibrium. The necessity of (A3) is similar to (A2).
Sufficiency: Observe that when (A2) is true, W1(n
min
1 ) < W2(N−nmin1 ). Similarly from (A3), we
have W2(n
min
2 ) < W1(N − nmin2 ). We know that for n1 > nmin1 , W1 is an increasing function,
and similar is the case for W2. Since we have a reversal in relative magnitude for W1 and W2,
and since the two curves are continuous, we must have an intersection of the curves between
nmin1 and n
min
2 , when both wait time curves are increasing. Such an intersection permits no
profitable deviation by switching to the other market for any driver, and is thus an all-regions
equilibrium.
Uniqueness: Both wait time curves are monotonic for the region n1 > n
min
1 and n2 = (N −n1) >
nmin2 , implying that there can only be one intersection between the curves when they are both
increasing.
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Together, these conditions are proven equivalent to existence and uniqueness of an all-regions
equilibrium. In such a case, we can characterize the all-regions equilibrium by equating the wait
time distributions.23 
To Prove Proposition 11, we first introduce the following Lemma.
Lemma A1. When (A1)-(A3) are satisfied and when drivers are allocated proportionally to de-
mand, the proportional allocation lies between the minimum wait times for the two regions: nmin1 <
φN < N − nmin2 .
where φ, as mentioned Appendix C.1.1, is defined as φ = λ1λ1+λ2 . By our assumption λ1 > λ2,
which came without loss of generality, we have φ > 12 . In graphical terms represented by Fig. 10,
this lemma says the vertical dashed line representing the proportional demand will fall between the
troughs of the two wait-time curves.







λ2t. Denote the total demand across both locations as





For proportional allocation to be situated between the two minimums on the graph, the following
conditions need to hold:
















Observe that since φ > 12 , C2 =⇒ C1. Thus, when the demand is more skewed (higher φ), we
need to have a larger platform size for condition (C2) to be satisfied.
We now prove that assumption (A1) + (A3) =⇒ (C2). Observe that condition that shows up





















, since N >
√
φΛt +√
(1− φ)Λt by assumption (A1).
23In practice, we obtain the allocation equating wait times, i.e. solving W1(n)−W2(N−n) = 0, which is equivalent
to identifying the roots of the polynomial equation below:
−n3(λ1 + λ2) + n2(2Nλ1 +Nλ2)− n(N2λ1 + 2tλ1λ2) +Ntλ1λ2 = 0
By Descartes’ rule of signs, this equation (i.e. the numerator) has potentially 3 positive roots. In the case of multiple
roots, only the one that lies between the minimum points of the wait time curves where both curves are increasing
is the symmetric equilibrium. See Proposition 9.
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1− φ) > 0
Observe that the last inequality must be true given our assumption that φ > 12 , so (A1) + (A3)
=⇒ (C2). This finishes the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 11. By Lemma A1, the demand-proportional allocation is in between
the minimum wait times for both regions. We show the proportional allocation or any point to the
left of it (i.e., an alloction with n1 ≤ φN) cannot be an all-regions equilibrium. This, combined with
the assumption in the proposition that an all-regions equilibrium exists, implies that the all-regions







To see why no all-regions equilibrium can be found weakly to the left of the proportional
allocation, note that at proportional allocation n = φN , region 2 wait time is higher than region
1, i.e. W2((1− φ)N) = NΛ +
t




(φ)N since φ >
1
2 . As we move left, region
2’s wait time increases further, while region 1’s wait time decreases until we reach the minimum
wait time for region 1, W (nmin1 ). Thus, the divergence between the two regions increases. For the
wait time curves to intersect, it must be in region 1’s decreasing wait time region. We know from
Proposition 9 that such an intersection will not be an all-regions equilibrium. Fig. 10 panel (c)
should help illustrate this point. This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Lemma A2. When an all-regions equilibrium exists for a ridesharing platform with N drivers
facing demand φΛ and (1− φ)Λ in the two regions:
1. an all-regions equilibrium also exists when demand is unchanged and there are N ′ = γN
drivers where γ > 1.
2. an all-regions equilibrium also exists when both the demand and number of drivers are scaled
up by a common factor γ > 1 to N ′ = γN and Λ′ = γΛ.
Proof of Lemma A2. Consider the equivalent conditions required for the existence of an all-
regions equilibrium, characterized by assumptions (A1)-(A3). Below, we show that if the conditions
are satisfied for a given (N,Λ), then they must be satisfied for (a) (N ′,Λ′) = (γN,Λ) as well as (b)
(N ′,Λ′) = (γN, γΛ).
54











holds since γ > 1 and (A1) holds for (N,Λ).
Next, we prove (A2). The proof of (A3) is similar to that of (A2) and is omitted.






















After some algebra and applying (A1), we obtain dψdρ > 0.
Now, for part (a), observe that setting ρ = N
′
N > 1 implies that, in (A2), the RHS increases and
the LHS does not change implying that (A2) still holds for (N ′,Λ′) = (kN,Λ).























We need to prove the above holds whenever (A1)-(A3) hold.
Since we know that ψ is an increasing function, we know that ψ(
√
γ) > ψ(1) when γ > 1. But
if we write out ψ(
√















Thus, when (N ′,Λ′) = (γN, γΛ), we find that (A2) holds for (N ′,Λ′).
Thus, (A1)-(A3) hold under the conditions detailed in the Lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 12. The proof of existence of all-regions equilibrium under the new
model primitives obtains from Lemma A2 above. To prove that the equilibrium supply ratios tilts
towards region 2, we first claim (but skip the straightforward proof) that if all the primitives of the
model (λ,N, t) are multiplied by same scaling factor, the existence of an all-regions equilibrium as
well as all of the
n∗i
n∗j
ratios (and, by construction, all λiλj ratios) are preserved. Therefore, in this
proof, instead of a multiplication of N and λ by a factor of γ > 1, we focus on fixing N and λ and,
instead, replacing t by t 1γ .
For the all-regions equilibrium (n∗1, n
∗
2), define α =
n∗1
N . We know from Proposition 11 that
α > φ. The quilibrium condition, written in terms of α will be:














where W d represents the difference between the total wait times between the two regions,
which should be zero at the equilibrium. We now use the implicit function theorem to show that









(1− α)α(2α− 1)(1− φ)φΛ
(α− 1)2α2N2 + (2(α− 1)α+ 1)(φ− 1)φΛt
(15)
The numerator is positive since α > 12 . Thus, the sign of
dα
dt
is determined by the denominator.
Below, we prove that the denominator is positive as well. The argument takes the following steps:
1. Define the denominator as g(α) = (α− 1)2α2N2 + (2(α− 1)α+ 1)(φ− 1)φΛt.
2. Observe that g′(α) = −2(2α − 1)
(
(1− α)αN2 + (1− φ)φΛt
)
< 0, implying that g(α) is a
decreasing function.













































φΛt)2 − tΛ(1− φ)
)
(17)
where the term in parentheses is positive directly from assumption (A1).
Thus, we know that
dα
dt
> 0 implying that as t increases, the proportion of supply going to the
higher-demand region is greater. 
Proof of Proposition 13. Note that a scale-up in N can be thought of as a scale-up in
(λ1, λ2, N), followed by a scale back down in (λ1, λ2). From Proposition 12, we know that the first
scale-up (i) preserves the existence of an all-regions equilibrium and also (ii) makes it strictly less
under-supplied in region 2. Therefore, the proof of Proposition (13) will be complete if we show
that the second scale back down also preserves the existence of an all-regions equilibrium and makes
it less under-supplied inn region 2.
To see this, suppose (n∗1, n
∗





i ∈ {1, 2} and some γ > 1. We will now show that under (λ′1, λ′2, N, t), there is an all-regions
equilibrium with strictly less under-supply in region 2 than what is implied by (n∗1, n
∗
2).
Lemma A3. The following statements are true about the “old” equilibrium allocation (n∗1, n
∗
2)




1. The total wait function W2(n) is strictly increasing at n = n
∗
2.
2. At the allocation (n∗1, n
∗












4. At the allocation proportional to demand, the wait time in region 2 is strictly larger than that





, then W2(n2) > W1(n1).
Proof of Lemma A3. We start by statement 1. To see this, first note that from the assumption
that (n∗1, n
∗
2) was the all-regions equilibrium under (λ1, λ2, N, t), we know n
∗
2 has to be strictly larger




λ2t. Now, given λ
′
2 < λ2, we
it is also the case that n∗2 >
√
λ′2t. Therefore, the new W2 function is also strictly increasing at
n = n∗2.
We now turn to statement 2. Given that (n∗1, n
∗
2) was the all-regions equilibrium under the old



















. This latter inequality,






. The sign of this inequality is preserved if we









The size of the inequality is also preserved when we add equal numbers to both sides. Those equal
numbers are the two sides of equation (18). This will give us:

































































This proves statement 2.
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Next, we turn to statement 3. The argument is similar to that for statement 1. N × λ1λ1+λ2 was
larger than the trough of W1 under the old parameters. Given that the trough gets smaller under
the new parameters, it will keep being smaller than N × λ1λ1+λ2 .
Finally, statement 4 is obvious from the proof of Proposition (11). 
Now notice that Lemma (A3) completes the proof of the proposition. Given that under the
allocation (n∗1, n
∗
2), we have W1 > W2, and under the allocation fully proportional to demand,





1 ) in between the two such that W1(n
∗′
1 ) = W2(n
∗′
2 ). This was achieved by























































which finishes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Theorem (1). Before stating the induction hypothesis, we add one statement to the
five statements of Theorem (1). The inclusion of this statement and leveraging it in the induction
process will be helpful for the proof. We call it statement 6.
Statement 6. Suppose an all region equilibrium n∗ = (n∗1, ..., n
∗
I) exists under primitives (λ,N, t)
where λ = (λ1, ..., λI). Then, demand arrival rates are scaled down, that is, under new primitives
(λγ , N, t) with γ > 1, we have:
• An all-regions equilibrium n∗′ = (n∗′1 , ..., n∗
′
I ) exists.
• The new equilibrium n∗′ shows less geographical supply inequity than n∗ in the sense that for














. The inequality is strict if and only if λi > λj.
In words, this statement simply says the geographical supply inequity decreases if, all else
fixed, all demand arrival rates proportionally decrease. The intuition is that this makes idle times
relatively more important than pickup times.
We can now state the strong induction hypothesis.
Induction Hypothesis. Take some natural number I0 > 2. If all statements of Theorem (1),
including statement 6 added above, are correct for I ∈ {2, ..., I0 − 1}, then they are also all correct
for I = I0.
Now, in order to prove the theorem, we need to take two steps. First, we should prove the
basis of the induction process. That is, we must show the theorem holds under I = 2. Second, we
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need to prove the induction hypothesis. As for the first step, note that propositions (9) through
(13) do this job. The only statement that is not explicitly proven by those theorem is statement 6.
However, the proof of statement 6 was the main building block of the proof of Proposition (13).24
We now turn to the second and main step of this proof, which is to show that the induction
hypothesis is correct (Note that some of the statements are not really proven based on the induction.
Nevertheless, we present all of the proofs in this inductive framework since we believe having one
induction as well as one non-induction section for the proof will just make it harder to read).
Proof of Statement 1. If the total wait time in region i is strictly higher than that in region
j, then given the continuity of these wait-time functions, a small enough mass of drivers can leave
region i for j and strictly benefit from that, violating the equilibrium assumption. To see why
they are increasing, suppose on the contrary, that at the equilibrium allocation, for region i, the
total wait time is strictly decreasing in the number of drivers in that region. Since drivers are
equal across all regions in equilibrium, drivers from any other region j will have the incentive to
relocate to region i, given that (i) currently region i has the same total wait as they do; and (ii)
once they move to region i, the total wait time of that region will decrease. This is a violation of
the equilibrium assumption. Therefore it has to be that at the equilibrium, the wait times are all
increasing in the number of drivers at all regions.
Proof of Statement 2. Suppose, on the contrary, that there are two different all-regions
equilibria n∗ and n̄. Given the two vectors are different, there has to be a region i such that
n∗i 6= n̄i. Without loss of generality, assume n∗i < n̄i. Given that, from statement 1, we know the
total wait time is increasing at n∗i , and given the fact that the wait time function, once it becomes
increasing, it remains strictly increasing, we can say Wi(n
∗
i ) < Wi(n̄i).
Now, again from statement 1, we know two things. First, ∀j : Wj(n∗j ) = Wi(n∗i ) & Wj(n̄j) =
Wi(n̄i), which implies: ∀j : Wj(n∗j ) < Wj(n̄j). Second, we know that the total wait time function
at each region j must be strictly increasing after it hits its trough (which happens weakly before
n∗j ). This implies that in order for ∀j : Wj(n∗j ) < Wj(n̄j) to hold, it must be that ∀j : n∗j < n̄j .
Therefore:
Σj=1,...,I0 n̄j > Σj=1,...,I0n
∗
j
But this cannot be given that both of the sums should be equal to N .
Proof of Statement 3. Note that the definition of equilibrium is that no driver should have
the incentive to relocate from one region to another. This definition, by construction, implies that
if n∗ = (n∗1, ..., n
∗
I0
) is an equilibrium under (λ,N, t), then once we fix Ñ = n∗i +n
∗
j for some i, j with
i < j, then the allocation (n∗i , n
∗
j ) is itself an equilibrium of the two-region game with primitives
(λi, λj , Ñ , t). Thus, by Proposition (11) (or alternatively, by the base of the induction), we know
24Also, propositions (9) through (13) assume that λ1 > λ2 and, hence, leave out the case where λ1 = λ2. But the
proofs for the case where I = 2 and λ1 = λ2 are straightforward and we leave them to the reader.
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if and only if n∗i = n
∗
j . It is easy to see that
n∗i = n
∗
j is an equilibrium given that it gives the two regions the same total wait time and that at
it, the total wait times must be increasing according to previous statements.
Proof of Statement 4. Before we start the proof of this statement, we note that, similar to
the case of Proposition (12), we can work with primitives (λ,N, tγ ) instead of (γλ, γN, t). As a
reminder, this is because there is a one-to-one and onto mapping between the equilibria under the




We start by proving the first statement. That is, if an all-regions equilibrium exists under
(λ,N, t), then one does under (λ,N, tγ ) as well. To see this, let us assume that under the “old” prim-
itives (λ,N, t), the all-regions equilibrium allocation n∗ is such that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., I0} : Wi(n∗i ) = w.
We know this common w must exist from statement 1, and we know it is unique from statement 2.
We show existence of an equilibrium allocation under the new primitive by first describing two “par-
tial equilibrium” allocations. We construct the first partial equilibrium allocation n̄ = (n̄1, ..., n̄I0)
by fixing n̄1 = n
∗
1 and assuming the rest of values (n̄2, ..., n̄I0 to be the equilibrium allocation of
drivers among regions 2 to I0 under primitives ((λ2, ..., λI0), N − n∗1, tγ ). In words, this allocation
fixes the number of drivers in region 1 (i.e., the region with the highest demand arrival rate λ1) at
its value under the old primitives but allows the drivers of all other regions to reshuffle themselves
among those regions. The second partial equilibrium allocation ñ fixes ñ1 = N × λ1Σi=1,...,I0λi , and
assumes the rest of values (ñ2, ..., ñI0 to be the equilibrium allocation of drivers among regions 2
to I0 under primitives ((λ2, ..., λI0), N × (1 − λ1Σi=1,...,I0λi ),
t
γ ). In words, this allocation fixes the
total number of drivers in region 1 at the value it would take if drivers were to be allocated fully
proportional to demand arrival rates. It then allows the rest of the drivers to reshuffle themselves
among other areas under the new primitives. We will use these two partial equilibrium allocations
to prove existence of an all-region equilibrium. But first we need to prove the existence of these
partial equilibrium allocations themselves. Lemma A4 below does this job.
Lemma A4. Partial equilibrium allocations ñ and n̄ described above exist, are unique, and allocate
a strictly positive number of drivers to each region.
Proof of Lemma (A4). We first start from n̄. Note that the assumption of n∗ being the
equilibrium allocation under (λ,N, t), by construction implies that (n∗2, ..., n
∗
I0
) is the unique all-
region equilibrium allocation under ((λ2, ..., λI0), N − n∗1, t). Now, given that by our induction
assumption all results (including statement 4) hold for I0 − 1 regions, if the primitives remain the
same except that t is divided by some γ > 1, a unique all-region equilibrium will still exist. This is
what we were denoting n̄2 through n̄I0 .
Next, we turn to ñ and construct it from n̄. We just showed that (n̄2, ..., n̄I0) is the unique




), which implies N −n∗1 < N × (1− λ1Σi=1,...,I0λi )). Therefore, primitives ((λ2, ..., λI0), N ×
(1 − λ1Σi=1,...,I0λi ),
t
γ ) can be constructed from primitives ((λ2, ..., λI0), N − n
∗
1, t) by increasing the
total number of drivers. Given that n̄ was the unique all-regions equilibrium allocation under
((λ2, ..., λI0), N − n∗1, t), and given the induction assumption on statement 5 for I = I0 − 1 regions,
we can say that primitives ((λ2, ..., λI0), N × (1 − λ1Σi=1,...,I0λi ),
t
γ ) also have a unique all-regions
equilibrium allocation. This is exactly what was denoted ñ2, ..., ñI0 . This completes the proof of
the lemma.
We now use these two partial equilibrium allocations to show that a unique all-regions equi-
librium allocation exists under primitives (λ,N, tγ ). Our next step is to prove the following useful
lemma.
Lemma A5. At the partial equilibrium allocation n̄, the total wait time in region 1 is larger than
that in any other region. Conversely, at the partial equilibrium allocation ñ, the total wait time in
region 1 is smaller than that in any other region.
Proof of Lemma (A5). To see why the result holds for n̄, note that under the old equilibrium




























Next, note that the main and only difference between allocations n∗ and n̄ is that under n̄, drivers
reshuffle among regions 2 to I0 in order to reduce their total wait times. Therefore, there has to be





























But the total wait time under (λ,N, tγ ) is equal across regions 2 through I0 under allocation n̄.
Therefore, the above inequality holds not only for a specific j , but under any j > 1. This proves
the lemma for n̄ given that n̄1 = n
∗
1.
Next, we prove the lemma for ñ. We first show that the wait time in region 1 is smaller than
that in region 2 if both get drivers proportional to their demand arrival rates. We then show that
the wait time in region 2 under ñ2 is larger than the wait time in region 2 if region 2 were to get
drivers proportional to its demand arrival rate. These two statements, combined, will prove our
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It is easy to see that the first terms of w1 and w2 are the same, and the second term is larger in w2
given that λ1 ≥ λ2. Now note that under allocation ñ, the wait time in region 1 is indeed w1. So, it
remains to show that W2(ñ2) ≥ w2. To show this, we make two observations (and prove them both
shortly). First, ñ2 ≥ N × λ2Σi∈{1,...,I0}λi . This simply says under ñ, region 2 is getting more drivers
than it would if drivers were to be allocated to regions proportionally to their demand rates. Second,
the total wait time function in region 2 is increasing between N × λ2Σi∈{1,...,I0}λi and ñ2. Together,
these two observations implyW2(ñ2) ≥ w2, as desired. Therefore, we have shown thatW2(ñ2) ≥ w1.
But given that (ñ2, ..., ñI0) was an all-regions equilibrium under ((λ2, ..., λI0), N×(1− λ1Σi=1,...,I0λi ,
t
γ ),
we know that for any i, j > 1 : Wi(ñi) = Wj(ñj). This, combined with W2(ñ2) ≥ w1, completes
the proof of the lemma, of course with the exception of the two observations made in this paragraph.
We now turn to proving those observations and finish the proof of the lemma.
The first observation was that ñ2 ≥ N × λ2Σi∈{1,...,I0}λi . To see why this is true, note that ñ is
the all-regions equilibrium under ((λ2, ..., λI0), N× (1− λ1Σi=1,...,I0λi ),
t
γ ). Therefore, by our induction
assumption on statement 3, region 2 will get disproportionately more drivers relative to all other















plugging this into (25) and rearranging, we get ñ2 ≥ N × λ2Σi∈{1,...,I0}λi , which is exactly our first
observation.
We now turn to the proof of the second observation. That is, we want to show that the total
wait time function in region 2 is increasing between N × λ2Σi∈{1,...,I0}λi and ñ2. To see this, note that
the wait time curve in region 2 takes the form that was depicted in figure (10). In particular, it is
a curve with only one trough; and once past the trough, the curve will remains strictly increasing
indefinitely. Thus, to prove that the wait-time is increasing over the interval [N × λ2Σi∈{1,...,I0}λi , ñ2],
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it is sufficient to show that the smallest point in this interval is past the trough. One can show the
trough happens at n2 =
√
t












arrive at a contradiction with the result that ñ is the all-regions equilibrium under ((λ2, ..., λI0), N×
(1 − λ1Σi=1,...,I0λi ,
t
γ ). Note that we are assuming, without loss of generality, λ2 ≥ λi for any i > 2.







. Thus, if we multiply the











then the direction of the inequality should not not change. Therefore, not only for region 2, but

























But N × (1 − λ1Σj∈{1,...,I0}λj ) is the total number of drivers in regions 2 through I0. That is:
N × (1− λ1Σj∈{1,...,I0}λj ) = Σj=2,...,I0 ñj . Therefore, we get:





which implies there should be at least one j ≥ 2 such that ñj <
√
t
γλj . But this means that for
that region j, the wait time function is decreasing at n = ñj contradicting the result that ñj is part
of an all-regions equilibrium. This completes the proof of the second observation, and hence that
of lemma (A5).
Next, we use lemma (A5) to construct an all-regions equilibrium under primitives (λ,N, tγ ).
This will be a constructive proof to the existence portion of statement 4. To this end, we start from
the first partial equilibrium n̄, gradually shifting drivers from region 1 to other regions until we are
left with ñ drivers in region 1. That is, for any n̂1 ∈ [ñ1, n̄1] we consider the partial equilibrium
n̂ = (n̂1, ..., n̂I0) such that the (n̂2, ..., n̂I0) is the all-regions equilibrium allocation under primitives
(λ2, ..., λI0), N − n̂1, tγ ). The argument for why such partial equilibrium exists for any n̂1 < n̄1 is
similar the argument given in proof of lemma (A4) for ñ1.
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Now, note that by lemma (A5), the total wait time in region 1 is larger than that in other regions
when n̂1 = n̄1 and it is smaller in region 1 than it is in other regions when n̂1 = ñ1. Therefore,
there should be some n̂1 ∈ [ñ1, n̄1] for which the total wait time in region 1 is equal to the total
wait time in all of the other regions, which themselves are equal to each other by n̂ being a partial
equilibrium the way defined above.25 We claim such allocation n̂ is the all-regions equilibrium of
the whole market (that is, under primitives (λ,N, tγ ) ). The proof for this claim is as follows:
We know that under allocation n̂ all regions have the same total wait time. We also know,
by (n̂2, ..., n̂I0) being the all-regions equilibrium under primitives (λ2, ..., λI0), N − n̂1, tγ ), that the
total wait time in each region i > 1 is increasing at n = n̂i. Thus, the only thing that remains
to be shown is that for i = 1 too the total wait time curve is increasing at n = n̂1. To this end,
as argued before in a similar case, we need to show that n̂1 ≥
√
t
γλ1. Note that given n̂1 ≥ ñ1,
it would suffice to show ñ1 ≥
√
t
γλ1. We show this latter inequality by borrowing from what we
already did in the proof of the last observation we made as part of proof of lemma (A5). There, we
proved inequality (26) holds. Now, given that we have been assuming (without loss of generality)




. Therefore, if we




, the sign of the








which is exactly what we were after. This shows that n̂ is the all-regions equilibrium, completing
the proof of the first part of statement 4 in the theorem.
Now that we have shown the all-region equilibrium n̂ under primitives (λ,N, tγ ) exists, we show
that it indeed shows less geographical supply inequity than the old equilibrium n∗. As the first
step towards this goal, note that for any j > i > 1, we can show the result holds based on our
induction assumption. More precisely, we know that (n∗2, ..., n
∗
I0
) is the all-regions equilibrium under
primitives ((λ2, ..., λI0), N−n∗1, t). We also know that (n̂2, ..., n̂I0) is the all regions equilibrium under
primitives ((λ2, ..., λI0), N − n̂1, tγ ). The move from primitives ((λ2, ..., λI0), N −n
∗
1, t) to primitives
((λ2, ..., λI0), N − n̂1, tγ ) involves two steps. The first step is to divide t by some γ > 1. The second
step is to add n∗1 − n̂1 drivers. Based on our induction assumption, both statements 4 and 5 of
Theorem (1) hold for I0 − 1 regions. Therefore, for any j > i > 1 we have:
25Note that in order to make this argument we also need to know that as we move n̂1 within [ñ1, n̄1], the total wait
time in region 1 as well as the common total wait time in the other regions both move continuously. This is true by
construction for region 1, since the total wait time function is continuous. For other regions, this needs to be shown
that as we add drivers to the collection of these regions, the equilibrium total wait time moves continuously. We skip











with the inequality strict if λi > λj . Now the only thing that remains to show is that we can
say the same not only for j > i > 1, but also for j > i = 1. In order to show this, we consider three
cases.
Case 1: for every j > 1, we have n̂j > n
∗
j . In this case, the result is becomes trivial given
that we know n̂1 ≤ n∗1.
Case 2: for at least two distinct j, j′ > 1, we have n̂j ≤ n∗j and n̂j′ ≤ n∗j′. We
start with j and note that the allocation of drivers in all regions other than j –i.e., allocation
(n̂1, ..., n̂j−1, n̂j+1, ..., n̂I0) is the all-region equilibrium under primitives ((λ1, ..., λj−1, λj+1, ..., λI0), N−
n̂j ,
t









) is the all-region equilibrium under prim-
itives ((λ1, ..., λj−1, λj+1, ..., λI0), N −n∗j , tγ ). Note that the former primitives can be obtained from
the latter by two moves. First, going from t to tγ for some γ > 1; and second, changing the total
number of drivers from N − n∗j to the (by assumption) larger number of N − n̂j . Based on our
induction assumptions, we know that both of these moves reduce the geographical supply inequity.










with the inequality strict if λ1 6= λi. This covers all of the comparisons that we needed with the
exception of the comparison between region 1 and region j itself. But we can prove the inequality
for that case as well, by going through the exact same process as above, except excluding region j′
this time instead of region j. This finishes the proof of statement 4 of the theorem under case 2.
Case 3: for exactly one region j > 1, we have n̂j ≤ n∗j . In this case, we can go through










with the inequality strict if λ1 6= λi. This time, however, we are not able to use a similar
argument for the to show the result holds between regions 1 and j. The following lemmas, however,
demonstrate a different way to prove the result for this specific comparison.
Lemma A6. Under the conditions of case 3, we have n̂1 ≥
n∗1√
γ and n̂j ≥
n∗j√
γ .
Proof of Lemma (A6). We only show n̂1 ≥
n∗1√
γ . The argument for n̂j ≥
n∗j√
γ is the same.
We start by observing that the total wait time w1 in region 1 under n1 =
n∗1√

































where w∗ is the common total wait time among all regions under primitives (λ,N, t) and the
all-regions equilibrium n∗ given those primitives.
Next, we show that under the new primitives (λ,N, tγ ), but at the old equilibrium allocation
n∗, the total wait-time in any region i is weakly larger than w
∗
√








Note that because n∗ is the all-region equilibrium under the old primitives, it must be that for
































































> w1. Now notice
that the total wait time under the new primitives at the old equilibrium alloction in any region is





γλi. This, combined with the fact that


















26This is true because there are at least three regions; and besides regions 1 and j, case 3 assumes n̂i > n
∗
i for all i.
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where ŵ is defined as the common total wait time among all regions under the new primitives
and new equilibrium allocation.
What ŵ > w1 tells us is that if we reduce the number of drivers in region 1 to n1 =
n∗1√
γ , the
total wait time in region 1 falls below the equilibrium total wait time. But this means it has to be
that n̂1 > n1 =
n∗1√
γ . To see why, consider two scenarios. First, if n1 <
√
t




we get n̂1 > n1. Next, if n1 ≥
√
t
γλ1, then the wait time curve is strictly increasing when moving
up from n1, which means at some point past n1, it hits the higher wait time ŵ > w1. That point
would be n̂1. Thus, the lemma has been proven for region 1. The proof for region j is exactly the
same. 
We now present the another useful lemma which helps us better understand what happens to
the two regions 1 and j.
Lemma A7. Consider a market with two regions 1 and 2 only. Allocation n∗ is an equilibrium
in this market under primitives (λ1, λ2, N, t) if and only if allocation
n∗√






Proof of Lemma (A7). Follows directly from definitions.
Now, lemmas (A6) and (A7) show us a clear way to complete the last piece of the inductive





define N∗ = n∗1 + n
∗




j ) was the all-regions equilibrium
under primitives (λ1, λj , N




γ ) is the all-regions





On the other hand, we know that (n̂1, n̂j) is the all-regions equilibrium under primitives
(λ1, λj , N̂ ,
t
γ ). Given that we showed N̂ >
N∗√
γ , and given that by our strong induction assumption


















with the inequality strict whenever λ1 > λj . This completes the proof of case 3, and hence
finishes the inductive proof of statement 4 of Theorem (1) with the exception of the last claim
about γ →∞, which we turn to next.








→ 1 as γ → ∞, assume first on the contrary, that this








does not approach 1 as γ → ∞. We use this










monotonically decreases as γ increases. Therefore, the only possibility for it to
not approach 1, is for it to approach a number strictly above one. Denote that number by κ > 1.
Also note that as γ → ∞, the equilibrium number of drivers in none of the regions tends to
zero. This is because (i) as immediately implied by the other claims in statement 4, the number
of drivers in the lowest demand region n∗
′
I is increasing in γ; and (ii) the number of drivers in any
other region is always weakly larger than n∗
′
I . This, along with the fact γ → ∞ is equivalent to









→ κ > 1 implies regions i and j have different limiting total wait times at the
equilibrium, which contradicts statement 1. This finishes the proof of the statement. 
Proof of Statement 6. The steps of this proof closely (almost exactly) follow the steps of the
proof of statement 4. We skip it but can provide the detailed proof upon request.
Proof of Statement 5. Similar to the corresponding two-region case (i.e., proof of Proposition
(13). This statement can be proven in a straightforward manner once we have proven statements
4 and 6. To be more precise, if we know that geographical supply inequity decreases in the sense
defined in the statement of the theorem both (i) when we proportionally scale-up N and the vector
λ and (ii) when we scale down the vector λ, it follows that the geographical supply inequity also
decreases when we only scale up N , which is a certain combination of (i) and (ii).
The above proofs show that (i) the theorem holds for I = 2 and that (ii) the theorem holds for
any I0 > 2 if it holds for all I ∈ {2, ..., I0 − 1}. This means our proof is complete.
C.2 Proofs under the assumption that region size is homogeneous
Proof of Proposition 1. Proof of Statement 1. To see that an equilibrium always exists,
note that all N drivers being in one region i is always an equilibrium. This is because under this
allocation, pickup times in all other regions are extremely large, incentivizing drivers to remain in
i.
To see uniqueness of equilibrium allocation n∗ conditional on the set of served areas J = {i :
n∗i > 0}, note that allocation n∗J (i.e., restriction of n∗ to regions in J) is an all-regions equilibrium
under primitives (λJ , N, t). We know from Theorem 1 that this equilibrium is unique. 
Proof of Statement 2. This also follows immediately from Theorem 1 and the observation
that n∗J is an all-regions equilibrium under (λJ , N, t). 
Proof of Statement 3. Suppose J = {i : n∗i > 0} and J ′ = {i : n∗
′
i > 0}. Also suppose
J ( J ′. Given that the total number of drivers under n∗ and n∗′ are the same, and given J ( J ′,
there has to be one region i ∈ J ′ such that n∗i > n∗
′
i .
Observe that n∗J is the all-regions equilibrium under (λJ , N, t) and n
′∗
J ′ is the all-regions equi-
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librium under (λJ ′ , N, t). Therefore, by Theorem 1, we know that in region i, total wait time is
strictly increasing in ni for any ni > n
∗′




i , implies that the total wait
time in region i is strictly higher under n∗ relative to n∗
′
. Given the equivalence of toatl wait time
across regions with positive supply, this means the total wait time in any served region under n∗ is
strictly higher than that in any served region under n∗
′
.
This finishes the proof of the proposition (albiet still under the assumption that t is uniform
across regions). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Denote the set up regions that get positive supply under n∗by J .
Statement 1 directly follows from Theorem 1 once we note that n∗J is the all-regions equilibrium
under primitives (λJ , N, t). Statement 2 follows directly from statement 1 given that under uniform
prices and wages, equilibrium wait times are uniform across regions as shown by Theorem 1. More





and the same holds for region j. Now, given Wi(n
∗
i ) = Wj(n
∗
j ),
statement 2 directly follows from statement 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Again, the proofs of all sections directly follow from Theorem 1 and
the observation that once we restrict attention to the set J = {i : n∗i > 0} of regions, then (i) n∗J
is an all regions equilibrium, and (λ′J , N
′, t′) is still a one (or two) sided thickening of (λJ , N, t). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Before proving the proof of the proposition, we prove the following
lemma.
Lemma A8. n∗∗1 > n
∗∗
2 .
Proof of Lemma A8. Suppose, on the contrary, that n∗∗i < n
∗∗
j . In this case, we can show
the platform will be better off swapping the allocation of drivers between the two regions. To see















































































































































But this last statement precisely says that the platform can strictly increase the total number





i ). Given that prices and wages are spatially uniform, this means the platform will also
strictly increase its profit through this action, which is a contradiction. Therefore, it has to be that
n∗∗1 ≥ n∗∗2 .
Now we also show that n∗∗1 = n
∗∗
2 is not the case either. To see this, note that the total platform
profit from these two regions is given by:












Subject to a constant n∗∗i + n
∗∗






where Wi is a suppressed notation for Wi(n
∗∗




2 , then we will
have Wi = Wj which means the platform optimal allocation coincides with the driver equilibrium.
But in that case, we know for sure that n∗∗1 6= n∗∗2 due to the fact that supply is skewed toward
region i This finishes the proof of the lemma. 











To see this, note that by eq. (29) and Lemma A8, we have Wi(n
∗∗
i ) < Wj(n
∗∗
j ). This means
if we start from the driver equilibrium allocation which sets Wi(n
∗
i ) = Wj(n
∗
j ), we will have to
reallocate some drivers from region i to region j in order to get to (n∗∗1 , n
∗∗





and n∗∗i < n
∗
i . Based on this, it is easy to see that Aj(n
∗∗
j ) > Aj(n
∗
j ) and Aj(n
∗∗







































































































which completes the proof of the proposition. 
C.3 Proofs under the assumption that region size is heterogeneous
We have shown so far that all of the results we proposed under fixed and uniform prices and
wages hold when there is no size heterogeneity across regions. We now show that all of these four
propositions still hold even if we relax that assumption and allow each region to have its own size
ti.
27 The key to this extension is the following lemma.
Lemma A9. Suppose that there is a “quantum region size” ∆. Consider market primitives (λ,N, t)
such that each region’s size ti can be written as a multiplier of this quantum size. That is: ti = xi∆
where xi ∈ N. Also, consider market primitives (λ̂, N, t̂) such that
t̂ = (∆, ...,∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
x1 times
,∆, ...,∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
x2 times



























27We would like to emphasize that we believe this two step approach (first working with homogeneous t and then
considering its heterogeneity) was not necessary. We believe it is likely that the proofs we provided so far would work
with heterogeneous t with minimal changes in the main steps. Nevertheless, we decided to take the two step approach
for two reasons. First, the proofs are already involved and directly dealing with heterogeneity in t would have led
to much less “clean” proofs. The second reason has to do with the progress on the proofs. Our original proofs were
based on homogeneous t but later we noticed that the homogeneity assumption was not necessary in any way.
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is an equilibrium under primitives (λ̂, N, t̂).
2. allocations n̂ that take the above form (i.e., with equal number of drivers among all regions
j with the same λ̂j) are the only possible equilibria under (λ̂, N, t̂) and the only possible
allocations that can maximize the platform profit under (λ̂, N, t̂).
3. platform profit from allocation n under market primitives (λ,N, t) is equal to its profit from
allocation n̂ under market primitives (λ̂, N, t̂).
4. Access to ride in any region i under allocation n and primitives (λ,N, t) is equal to access to
rides in any region j with λ̂j =
λi
xi
under allocation n̂ and primitives (λ̂, N, t̂).
Proof of Lemma A9. The proof is straightforward. It is immediate that n̂ sums up to N .
It is also immediate that in each region j with demand arrival rate λ̂j =
λi
xi






























It is also immediate to see that Ŵj(·) is increasing at n̂j if and only if Wi(·) is increasing at
n∗i . Finally, by Theorem 1, it can be seen that no equilibrium under (λ̂, N, t̂) can give two different
volumes of drivers to two regions of the same size that have the same arrival rate of demand.
Next, note that by Proposition 4, if two regions have the same size and the same demand
density, then the platform would also optimally want the same number of drivers in those regions.
Additionally, given what we established regarding the wait-time equivalence between the two
regions, it is straightforward to verify that platform profits are equal between n and n̂.










This establishes the lemma. 
This lemma is powerful in that it shows any market primitives with heterogeneous t can, with
a small enough ∆, be approximated with some market primitives with homogeneous t without loss
of the equilibria. In other words, the lemma shows there is a 1-to-1 mapping between the equilibria
under (λ̂, N, t̂) and (λ,N, t). This allows us to complete the proofs of Proposition 1 through
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Proposition 4 –which were stated for heterogeneous t but so far proven only for homogeneous t.
Here, we only provide the basic steps of the proof and avoid going through all the steps, which
are notationally cumbersome but conceptually straightforward (full steps would available upon
request). The basic idea for proving Proposition 1 through Proposition 4 for general (λ,N, t) with
heterogeneous t is as follows: If all ti are dividable by a common ∆, then use that ∆ and take the
following steps:
1. Using Lemma A9, “transform” the allocations and primitives in the proposition from the
(λ,N, t) space to the (λ̂, N, t̂) space.
2. Given t̂ is homogeneous, apply the proposition.
3. Again, using the provisions of Lemma A9, show that the proposition holding under (λ̂, N, t̂)
means it also holds under (λ,N, t).
If there is no common ∆ by which all ti are dividable, then each xi will be the quotient in the
division of ti by ∆. This means the proposition holding for (λ̂, N, t̂) will not imply it also holds
for (λ,N, t). It will, rather, hold for an approximation of (λ,N, t). But the approximation will get
more and more accurate as we make ∆ smaller. Thus, the proof will be obtained as ∆→ 0.
D Proofs for results with endogenous platform strategy
Before starting these proofs, we make an observation. As mentioned in the main text of the paper,
we have made the total number of drivers N endogenous in this section. Although in the first glance
this adds another layer of complexity on top of prices and wages becoming endogenous, a closer
look shows this in fact makes the proofs more manageable. This is because with an endogenous N ,
the problem in each region will be, in some sense, separate from other regions. As such, induction
in the number of regions will not be a required step any more. The analysis of the platform optimal
behavior does present a challenge, however. We employ monotone comparative static techniques
from the literature in order to address those challenges and prove our propositions.
Proof of Proposition 5. We start by proving the statements about economies of density.
Then we will move on to statements regarding the role of market thickness.
Proof of Statements 1 and 2 on Economies of Density. To prove the result for the whole
market, we can prove it for every region i separately. As such, in what follows, we suppress the
index i. As such, in this proof, n∗ does not stand for the vector of all driver presence volumes
in all regions, but just the number of drivers in region i. We will also suppress some equilibrium





Note that in the equilibrium, the hourly revenue for drivers has to be equal to the reservation














Note that only the larger solution (i.e., the one with the + sign) is an equilibrium because at the
lower solution, further driver entry will lead to lower overall wait time, increasing driver revenue.










Now note that platform profit in the region is given by π = (p− c)× n∗W .
Replacing for W and n∗ respectively from eq. (31) and eq. (32), we get:
















)2 < 0 (34)
then it means eq. (32) will have a real valued root only if the platform sets c > p. That is, the
platform can only attract drivers to the region by offering them a wage higher than price p, thereby
running a net loss itself. Thus, the platform’s optimal action will be to set a wage that will attract


















which exactly says the region will not get any drivers if the density of potential demand falls
short of some cutoff as statement 2 of the proposition says.
74
Our second observation is about the uniqueness of the equilibrium wage when the region does
get a positive number of drivers. To ease the notation, denote 4tc̄
2
λ(p) simply by a. This gives







writing the first order condition in terms of c and rearranging yields
√
c2 − a = ap
c2
− c
This equation can have only one root given that the left hand side is strictly increasing in c
while the right hand side is strictly decreasing. Thus, the optimal wage c∗ is unique. We know by
eq. (32) that this means n∗ is unique too. This finishes the proofs of statements 1 and 2 of the
proposition. 
Proof of Statement 3 on Economies of Density. Given that the problem in each region is
separate from others, this statement is equivalent to the statement that A(n∗) is strictly increasing
in λ̄t in each region (Note that we are keeping suppressing the region subscripts). In the rest of the







Writing out A in terms of the primitives of the model as well as platform strategy parameters





















This equation shows that A depends on λ̄t but not on either λ̄ or t separately. Therefore, in
order to show A increases as λ̄t , we do not need to show that A is both increasing in λ̄ and decreasing
in t. Only one of the two would be sufficient. We choose to focus on the comparative static in t.
We will make the same choice in other parts of the proof of this proposition as well as the other
remaining propositions.
Our next step is to show that A is strictly decreasing in t. Note that given the uniqueness result
in statement 1, there is a 1-to-1 relationship between access A and wage c in the region. Therefore,
the platform could be thought of as optimally choosing A as opposed to optimally choosing c.
This reduces the problem to a monotone comparative static problem of showing the optimal A is
decreasing in the value of t. This allows us to use standard monotone comparative statics theorems
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a la Milgrom and Shannon. We need to prove that the profit function is strictly submodular in A




To show this, we first write π out in terms of A instead of c. Recall that platform profit in the
region is given by:
π = (p− c) n
W
(37)
We need to rewrite so that dependence of π on c (both direct and through n and W ) is expressed



























Replacing from eq. (38) and eq. (39) into eq. (37), we get:







Now that we have the right expression, we want to show ∂
2π
∂A×∂t < 0. Or equivalently, we want










Given that λ̄, f(p), c̄, and t are all positive constants, it would suffice to show − Af(p)−A is strictly
decreasing in A. This is immediate by noticing the negative sign, the fact that the numerator is
positive and strictly increasing in A, and that the denominator is positive and strictly decreasing
in A. This finishes the proof of statement 3 of the proposition. 
Proof of Statement 4 on Economies of Density. Next, we will show that regions with
higher density of potential demand λ̄iti will get lower wages ci when prices are fixed and spatially
uniform. Similar to the previous statements, this one can also be proven through a comparative
static result focusing on each region. We show that if a region’s density of potential demand
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increases, then the optimal wage chosen by the platform for that region decreases. Again, we will
be suppressing notations on region indices as well as equilibrium “∗” notations. In the proof for
this statement, we take a similar approach to the one we took for the previous statement. We write




which means the optimal wage c∗ will be strictly increasing in t and, hence, strictly decreasing
in density λ̄t .
Replacing from eq. (32) into the eq. (37) and rearranging yields:


















It is easy to see that ∂π∂t is strictly increasing in c. This is because the two terms in the numerator
are strictly decreasing in c, the term in the denominator is strictly increasing in c, and there is a
negative sign. This shows that π is a strictly supermodular function in c and t, thereby showing
that if t increases, so does the optimal level of c. This finishes the proof of this statement. 
Next we turn to those statements in the proposition that have to do with the role of market
thickness.
Proof of Statement 1 on the Role of Market Thickness. This is straightforward given

















)2 ⇒ n∗′i > 0. 
Proof of Statement 2 on the Role of Market Thickness. First note that the second









< 1) is implied by statement 3 on


















In order to prove this statement, we first state and prove a lemma. Recall, again, that given
under flexible N the optimization problems in different regions are separate from each other, then
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the equilibrium access Ai(n
∗
i ) is only a function of λ̄i, ti, pi, ci rather than those at other regions.
Therefore, the notation i may be suppressed. In the proofs of some of the last statements we have
even suppressed the notation on n∗ and denote the equilibrium access in region i simply by A. In
our next lemma, we will keep suppressing those notations. We also note that access has been an
implicit function of model parameters, in particular λ̄f(p)t (we showed that equilibrium access is
not separately dependent on λ̄, t, and f(p) otherwise). Denote λ̄f(p)t by d. In the proof of this
lemma, we make the exposition of the dependence of equilibrium access A on parameter d explicit
by denoting the equilibrium access as A(d). In other words, A(d) is the equilibrium access in a
region with density d when the platform has set the optimal wage c∗ given density d and price p
and drivers respond accordingly.
Lemma A10. Define function B(τ) as
B(τ) ≡ log(A(eτ ))
Then statement 2 of Proposition 5 on the role of market thickness holds if B is a strictly convcave
function whenever defined.
Proof of Lemma A10. First notice that B is defined whenever A > 0 which is whenever τ is
larger than some cutoff.
Next, take two regions i, j with λ̄iti >
λ̄j
tj
. Set τi = log(
λ̄if(p)
ti




β = log(γ) where γ is the scalar larger than one in the statement of the proposition. By strict
concavity of B, we have:
B(τi + β)−B(τi) < B(τj + β)−B(τj)
This implies:
































which is exactly the statement we needed to prove. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Therefore, the only thing we need to prove is strict concavity of the function B. Our next
lemma does this.
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Lemma A11. Function B as defined in the previous lemma is strictly concave.
Proof of Lemma A11. Take τ and τ + 2β for some positive β such that B(τ) and B(τ + 2β)
are both defined (i.e., the corresponding A values are both positive). The proof of the lemma will
be complete if we can show:
B(τ + β) >
B(τ) +B(τ + 2β)
2
(43)
Denote d = eτ and γ = eβ. Also denote Â = A(d). Additionally, from the previous parts of this
proposition, we know A(dγ2) > A(d). Therefore, if we write A(dγ2) = A(d)ζ2 for some positive ζ,
then it has to be that ζ > 1. At this point, one can observe that eq. (43) is equivalent to
A(dγ) >
√
A(d)A(dγ2) = A(d)ζ = Âζ (44)
To establish the above inequality, we first write out the platform profit function in terms of A
(again treating A is the decision variable) and, then, characterize the first order condition which
gives A(d) for any d (recall that A(d) is the optimal A under d). This is done in eq. (40). If we


























)3 = 0 (46)
Replacing for t
λ̄












)3 = 0 (47)















= g(dγ2, Âζ2) (48)
In order to prove eq. (44), we need to show that under dγ and at A = Âζ we have ∂π∂A > 0
(because this would mean the first order condition would hold at some A > Âζ, implying exactly








To prove this, it would be sufficient to show
log(g(dγ, Âζ)) <
log(g(d, Â)) + log(g(dγ2, Âζ2))
2

























⇔ log(f(p)−Aζ) > log(f(p)−A) + log(f(p)−Aζ
2)
2
This last inequality holds if we can show that the function log(f(p) − Aeν) is strictly concave








which is strictly decreasing in ν. This finishes the proof of this statement of the proposition. 
Proof of Statement 3 on the Role of Market Thickness. This statement is straightfor-
ward is is left to the reader. 
This finishes the proof of Proposition 5. 
Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof of Statements 1 and 2 on Economies of Density. The steps of this proof are similar
to the corresponding steps in the previous theorem. A given region will have a positive number
of drivers in equilibrium if it can attract drivers when the price in the region is equal to the fixed
















which proves statement 2. Also, eq. (32) holds in this case too, which implies uniqueness of n∗
if optimal price p is unique. We now show that optimal price p is indeed unique. More precisely, we
want to show that there is a unique p maximizing π in eq. (33) when λ(p) ≡ λ̄(1−αp). Alternatively,
we can show that there is a unique p maximizing log(π). If we write the first order condition for












































The first order condition can only have one solution given that every one of the three terms in
the left hand side expression is strictly decreasing in p. This finishes the proofs of statements 1 and
2 regarding economies of density. 
Proof of Statements 3 on Economies of Density. Similar to the case of the previous
proposition, it will suffice to show that the optimal p is strictly increasing in the density of the
region. This immediately follows from observing that, in the proof of the previous statement of
this theorem, ∂ log(π)∂p is strictly decreasing in t, meaning log(π) is strictly sub-modular in t and p.
This implies that the p that maximizes log(π) (and hence π itself) is strictly decreasing in t. That
is, the optimal p is strictly increasing in density of potential demand λ̄t . 
Proof of Statement 1 on the Role of Market Thickness. Similar to the equivalent
statement in Proposition 5, this statement follows directly from the proofs of statements 1 and 2
on economies of density. 
Proof of Statement 2 on the Role of Market Thickness. Similar to the equivalent
statement in Proposition 5, the proof of this statement is straightforward and is left to the reader.

This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 7. This proposition is substantially more complex than Proposition 5
and Proposition 6 because the endogeneity of prices and wages at the same time makes things
intractable. On the other hand, we show that prices and wages both being endogenous also leads
to an advantage. It reduces the set of the input parameters of the model to (λ̄, t, c̄, α). That is, p
81
or w is not part of the model parameters any more. We prove a series of lemmas that show under
these parameters, the proposition can be reduced to a numerical problem. That is, we first show
that the proposition holds for a general (λ̄, t, c̄, α) if and only if it holds for (λ̄, 1, 1, 1). Showing
that the proposition holds for (λ̄, 1, 1, 1) is essentially numerical, which we carry out accordingly.
Lemma A12. Assume γ ∈ R is a strictly positive number. Under primitives (λ̄, t, c̄, α), vectors p∗,





= c∗, and n∗
′
= γn∗ constitute an equilibrium (note that here, unlike the pre-
vious two propositions, we are not suppressing the ∗ notation for equilibria or the regional indices).
Additionally, access to rides in all regions are equal under these two equilibria: ∀i : A∗′i = A∗i .
Proof of Lemma A12 Let us expand the notation on platform profits and equilibrium numbers
of drivers across the market in a way that allows for explicitly tracking the dependence of all of
these on market primitives. To be more specific, we denote the equilibrium number of drivers in
region i under primitives (λ̄, t, c̄, α) and platform strategy (p, c) by:
n∗i (p, c|λ̄, t, c̄, α)
Similarly, we denote the platform profit by:
πi(p, c|λ̄, t, c̄, α)
We now turn to the proof of the lemma, starting with a claim:
Claim 1. For any given (p, c), we have:
πi(p, c|γ2λ̄, t, γc̄, α) = γ2πi(p, c|λ̄, t, c̄, α).
Proof of Claim 1. To see this, note that under (λ̄, t, c̄, α), region i will attract no drivers –hence














The above two conditions are equivalent. This finishes the proof of the claim. 
Now let us assume p and c are such that region i does get a positive number of drivers. There,
from eq. (32), the number of drivers present in i under (λ̄, t, c̄, α) will be uniquely give by:
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The same quantity under (γ2λ̄, t, γc̄, α) will be uniquely give by:


















= γn∗i (p, c|λ̄, t, c̄, α)
Also note that the equilibrium driver wait time Wi in region i under (λ̄, t, c̄, α) has to be
ci
c̄ in order to equate driver earnings in the region with the reservation value. Similarly, under
(γ2λ̄, t, γc̄, α), the driver wait time in region i will be ciγc̄ .
Next, note that for any p, c:
πi(p, c|λ̄, t, c̄, α) = (pi − ci)×




πi(p, c|γ2λ̄, t, γc̄, α) = (pi − ci)×
n∗i (p, c|γ2λ̄, t, γc̄, α)
ci
γc̄
= (pi − ci)×
γn∗i (p, c|λ̄, t, c̄, α)
ci
γc̄
= γ2πi(p, c|λ̄, t, c̄, α)
Therefore, the profit functions under (λ̄, t, c̄, α) and (γ2λ̄, t, γc̄, α) are fully proportional in each
region, which mean they will have the exact same maximizers p∗ and c∗. Given these maximizers,
we will have the number of drivers in each region i under (γ2λ̄, t, γc̄, α) will be given by:
n∗
′






















The proof of the lemma is now complete. 
Lemma A13. Assume γ ∈ R is a strictly positive number. Under primitives (λ̄, t, c̄, α), vectors





= γc∗, and n∗
′
= n∗ constitute an equilibrium Additionally, access to rides in
all regions are equal under these two equilibria: ∀i : A∗′i = A∗i .
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Proof of Lemma A13. The steps of the proof for this lemma are very similar to those in the
proof of Lemma A12. Hence, we skip the details. 
We just point out that there is a simple intuition for this result: a change of primitives from
(λ̄, t, c̄, α) to (λ̄, t, γc̄, αγ ) should not be expected to change the equilibria because it is effectively a
“currency change.” The only two places where “money” becomes involved in the model are where
demand is determined based on the price of a ride and where supply is determined based on wage.
If the reservation hourly revenue is multiplied by γ and, at the same time, the price sensitivity of
passengers is divided by the same factor γ, it is as if we are looking at the same market but with
a new currency one unit of which is worth 1γ times one unit of the old currency. This should not
change the equilibrium supply, demand, and access. It should only multiply the equilibrium prices
and wages by γ.
Lemma A14. Assume γ ∈ R is a strictly positive number. Under primitives (λ̄, t, c̄, α), vectors p∗,





= c∗, and n∗
′
= γn∗ constitute an equilibrium Additionally, access to rides in
all regions are equal under these two equilibria: ∀i : A∗′i = A∗i .
Proof of Lemma A14. Again, the steps of this proof are very similar to those in the previous
two lemmas. As such, we skip the details. .
Our next lemma combines the previous three.
Lemma A15. Under primitives (λ̄, t, c̄, α), vectors p∗, c∗, and n∗ constitute an equilibrium if and
only if under primitives (λ̃, 1, 1, 1) where λ̃i =
λ̄i
(c̄α)2ti





= αc∗, and n∗
′
= 1(c̄α)tn
∗. Additionally, access to rides in all regions are
equal under these two equilibria: ∀i : A∗′i = A∗i .
Proof of Lemma A15. Apply Lemma A12 with γ = 1c̄α on primitives (λ̄, t, c̄, α). On the
resulting primitives, apply Lemma A13 with γ = α. Finally, on the resulting primitives, apply
Lemma A14 with γ = 1t . This will establish the equivalence claimed in this lemma. 
With this result in hand, we now turn to the main two lemmas that prove Proposition 7.
Lemma A16. Proposition 7 holds under all generic primitives (λ̄, t, c̄, α) if it holds under primitives
in the form of (λ̃, 1, 1, 1).
Proof of Lemma A16. Suppose Proposition 7 holds for all primitives that take the form
of (λ̃, 1, 1, 1). We show it holds for a general (λ̄, t, c̄, α). To this end, choose vector λ̃ such that
∀i : λ̃i = λ̄i(c̄α)2ti . Next, we prove each statement of Proposition 7 for general primitives.
Statement 1 on economies of density. There is a unique equilibrium under (λ̃, 1, 1, 1). Denote
it ñ. By Lemma A15, there is also a unique equilibrium n∗ under (λ̄, t, c̄, α), which is given by
ñi(c̄αti) for each i. Also, for any i for which ñi > 0, we know there are unique equilibrium price p̃i
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and wage w̃i. This happens if and only if n
∗
i > 0. In this case, again according to Lemma A15, the
price and wage are also unique under (λ̄, t, c̄, α).
Statement 2 on economies of density. By assumption know there is a µ such that:
∀i : λ̃i
1
< µ⇔ ñi = 0
Note that by construction, λ̃i < µ is equivalent to
λ̄i
ti
< µ(c̄α). Also note that n∗i = 0 if and
only if ñi = 0. Therefore, we have:
∀i : λ̄i
ti
< µ(c̄α)⇔ n∗i = 0
which finishes the proof of statement 2 on economies of density.
Statement 3 on economies of density. By assumption, this statement holds under (λ̃, 1, 1, 1).
By the construction of λ̃, it is immediate that:






Also by Lemma A15, we know that equilibrium access to rides in each region i is the same
under (λ̃, 1, 1, 1) and (λ̄, t, c̄, α). It immediately follows that statement 3 holds under (λ̄, t, c̄, α).
Statement 4 on economies of density. Note that by construction of λ̃ and by Lemma A15, for
any i, j the following hold:
1. λ̃i ≥ λ̃j ⇔ λ̄iti ≥
λ̄j
tj
and a similar statement when both inequalities are strict.
2. c̃i ≤ c̃j ⇔ c∗i ≤ c∗j and a similar statement when both inequalities are strict.
3. p̃i ≤ p̃j ⇔ p∗i ≤ p∗j and a similar statement when both inequalities are strict.
4. p̃i− p̃j ≤ c̃i− c̃j ⇔ p∗i −p∗j ≤ c∗i − c∗j and a similar statement when both inequalities are strict.
These four statements, together with the assumption that statement 4 of the proposition on
economies of density holds under (λ̃, 1, 1, 1) imply that it also holds under (λ̄, t, c̄, α).
Next, we prove the statements of the proposition that are about the role of market thickness.
Key to proving all of those results is the observation that the same equivalence established between
(λ̃, 1, 1, 1) and (λ̄, t, c̄, α) by Lemma A15 may also be established between (γλ̃, 1, 1, 1) and (γλ̄, t, c̄, α)
for any positive real γ. Even the multipliers 1
(c̄α)2ti
remain the same. With this observation, we
turn to the proofs.
Statement 1 on the role of market thickness. By Lemma A15, we know n∗i > 0 ⇒ ñi > 0. By
the proposition being true for (λ̃, 1, 1, 1), we know that ñi > 0⇒ ñ′i > 0 where ñ′ is the equilibrium
driver allocation under (γλ̃, 1, 1, 1). Finally, again by Lemma A15, we have ñ′i > 0⇒ n∗
′
i > 0. This
finishes the proof of this statement.
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Statement 2 on the role of market thickness. Lemma A15 shows that access to rides in all
regions is preserved under the transformation from (λ̄, t, c̄, α) to (λ̃, 1, 1, 1) and the transformation
from (γλ̄, t, c̄, α) to (γλ̃, 1, 1, 1). This, together with λ̃i ≥ λ̃j ⇔ λ̄iti ≥
λ̄j
tj
and the assumption that
the proposition holds under (λ̃, 1, 1, 1) gives the proof of this statement under (γλ̄, t, c̄, α).
Statement 3 on the role of market thickness. The logic for the proof of this statement is identical
to that for the proof of the previous one.
The proof of Lemma A16 is now complete. 
Our last step in proving Proposition 7 is to show that it does indeed hold under (λ̃, 1, 1, 1). The
convenient feature of this remaining step is that it can be done fully numerically. The following
lemma takes on this task.
Lemma A17. Proposition 7 holds if (λ̄, t, c̄, α) takes the specific form of (λ̃, 1, 1, 1).
Proof of Lemma A17. We start by proving statement 2 and then move to statement 1 on
economies of density.
Statement 2 on economies of density. Here, we are looking for conditions on potential demand
λ̄i such that the platform can get a positive number of drivers into region i without sustaining any















As such, the minimum requirement volume for λ̃i depends on the maximum possible value for
c2i (1− pi) subject to the constraint that the platform does not run any losses. This happens when







This says each region i gets a positive number of drivers if and only if λ̃i ≥ 27 which proves
statement 2 of the proposition on economies of density.
Next, we prove the rest of the statements numerically. To do this, we need to study the
equilibrium price p̃i, equilibrium wage c̃i, equilibrium number of drivers ñi, and equilibrium access
Ãi in a given region i as a function of λ̃i. The key is that all of the other parameters are equal to
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1 and λ̃i is the only parameter changing. Therefore, for any value that λ̃i assumes, we have a fully
numerical problem that can be solved using a software such as R. Below, we are providing graphs of
these equilibrium quantities as functions of λ̃i. Fig. 11 provides these results. The figure gives the
unique optimal price and wage computed for λ̃i ≥ 27. As shown in the figure, optimal price p̃i and
optimal wage c̃i both strictly decrease in density λ̃i. This means if two regions i, j are such that
λ̃i > λ̃j , then region j will have a higher price and a higher wage in the equilibrium. Also margin
p̃i − c̃i is strictly increasing in density. This means if two regions i, j are such that λ̃i > λ̃j , then
region j will have a lower margin in the equilibrium. Additionally, access Ãi is strictly increasing
in density. This means if two regions i, j are such that λ̃i > λ̃j , then region j will have a lower
access to rides in the equilibrium. These results show that the statements on economies of density
hold.
As for statements on the role of market thickness, statement 1 follows directly from statement
2 on economies of density. Statement 2 on the role of market thickness can be seen from the last
panel in Fig. 11 which shows that log of access is concave in log of density. Recall from Lemma A10
that this would imply statement 2 on the role of market thickness. Finally, statement 3 on the
role of market thickness is straightforward and left to the reader (the key would be to note that as
the market gets sufficiently large, pickup times in all regions become negligible; hence the pricing
problem in all regions boils down to that in a model without economies of density, giving all regions
the same price, wage, and access to rides).
This finishes the proof of Lemma A17 and, hence, Proposition 7.
E Proof of the Proposition in the Empirical Section




“gets absorbed” by the Q-level fixed effects, keeping intact all of the other coefficients
as well as the error terms. Here, we provide a proof for the case where fixed effects embedded in
controls Xikd are exactly at the Q level. We will skip the proof for the case where the fixed effects
are at a level finer than Q but
λ̄→ikd
λ̄→ikd
can be determined fully based on Q. That proof is conceptually
the same (because finer fixed effects will absorb the differences more easily) but the notations will
be much less clean.
Now, assume the matrix of control variables X is given by:
X = [FQ X̄]
where FQ is the set of columns giving the Q-level fixed effects and X̄ consists of the rest of the
controls. That is, each column in FQ corresponds to one possible value q that Qikd can assume;
and each row ikd of FQ in the column corresponding to q is 1 if Qikd = q and zero otherwise.
Consequently, also assume β = [βF βX̄ ]. We now introduce the following lemma.
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Lemma A18. Coefficients α and β = [βF βX̄ ] and error terms εikd satisfy eq. (5) if and only if
coefficients α, β̃, and error terms εikd satisfy eq. (8), where β̃ is defined as [βG βX̄ ], and βG is
a vector constructed from βF by subtracting log(g(q)) from any element of βF from the column in
FQ that corresponds to value q.
Proof of Lemma A18.
log(ROikd) = α log(D
←
ikd) + βXikd + εikd ⇔
log(ROikd) = α log(D
←
ikd) + βF × F
Q













) = α log(D←ikd) + (βF × F
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) = α log(D←ikd) + βG × F
Q


















) = α log(D←ikd) + β̃Xikd + εikd ⇔




) = α log(D←ikd) + β̃Xikd + εikd
which finishes the proof of the lemma. 
Note that according to Lemma A18, each error term εikd remains intact under this equivalence.
It follows immediately that the unique estimated value for α, which is part of estimated parameters
minimizing the GMM error in eq. (5), will also be the unique estimated value for α in eq. (8) as
well. 
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F Relative Outflows at the Borough Level
In this section, we present relative outflows at the borough level for Uber, Lyft, and Via. The
observed patterns are similar to those at the zones level: (i) busier boroughs have higher relative
outflows; and (ii) the relative-outflow gap is wider for smaller platforms. This figure should also
help with the understanding of some of the less intuitive patterns in the zones-level relative outflows
in Fig. 3 in the main text. In Fig. 3, one can see that some relative outflows in parts of Staten
Island and Queens are higher than some in Manhattan. Here, we would like to point out why
these patterns emerge and explain why the potential bias they cause is in fact against our results
(meaning the magnitudes of our results would be even larger if we “corrected” for these patterns).
We believe the large relative outflows in Staten Island and Queens arise from two sources. First,
in Queens, the areas with larger relative outflows tend to be close to airports. We believe this is
likely a consequence of the fact that rideshare companies have historically been more restricted
when it comes to picking up passengers at airports. Therefore, drivers who drop off passengers at
airports may need to look for new passengers nearby which creates economies of density in those
regions. The second, and more important, reason for larger relative outflows in some “unexpected”
regions has more to do with the nature of intra-city transportation. As an extreme case, suppose
all rides took place within boroughs, meaning each ride’s origin was located in the same borough
as its destination. In that case, one would expect the highest relative outflow in each borough
to be above 1 and the lowest relative outflow in each borough to be below 1 (this is because
rides are balanced overall). Therefore, each borough’s highest relative outflow would be higher
than any other borough’s lowest relative outflow, no matter how the densities of the two boroughs
compare. Of course the assumption that all rides are within-borough is an extreme assumption but
if a reasonably large fraction of rides happen within boroughs, we should expect similar relative
outflows patterns. Consistent with our hypothesis about this explanation, these patterns are not
observed when we look at the borough-level relative outflows graphs in Fig. 12.
Note that these patterns (especially the second one) can be reasonably controlled for using
borough fixed effects. We would also like to note that any potential bias these patterns may cause
in our results would be against our hypothesis that α in eq. (5) and eq. (8) is positive. This is in
line with the observation that once we control for boroughs, the estimated α increases.
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(e) Response of log access to log density
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